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INTRODUCTION
Pretrial practice in federal civil litigation has dramatically changed
over the last thirty years. Pretrial practice, pleading, discovery, Daubert
1
motions, summary judgment, and settlement have become the focus
of federal civil litigation while trials have vanished. Judges have become managers and gatekeepers, while juries have disappeared. Public adjudication in courts has been reduced. Judicial gatekeeping is
happening at an earlier stage than ever before. The recent Supreme
2
3
Court decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
which have dramatically heightened pleading standards, are already
4
5
turning 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss into early summary judgments.
Iqbal has been described as the “sleeper case” of the 2008 Term because of its unexpected impact on every federal civil matter filed in
6
the federal courts. One commentator noted that “Iqbal is the most
significant Supreme Court decision in a decade for day-to-day litiga7
tion in the federal courts.” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who dissented from the decision, told a group of federal judges at the Second
Circuit Judicial Conference that the ruling was both important and
8
dangerous. “In my view,” she said, “the [C]ourt’s majority messed up
9
the federal rules” governing civil litigation.

1

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (holding that
the trial judge must review proposed expert scientific testimony and assess “whether
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and . . .
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue”).
2
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
4
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted”).
5
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Everything today’s majority says would . . . make perfect sense if it were ruling on a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment. . . . But . . . a heightened production burden at the summary judgment
stage does not translate into a heightened pleading burden at the complaint stage.”).
6
Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Ruling Hits Plaintiffs’ Attorneys: Term’s “Sleeper
Case” Requires Plaintiffs to List Specific, Detailed Allegations to Reach Discovery, L.A. DAILY J.,
July 28, 2009, at 1 (noting that Iqbal’s “impact is likely to prove far greater than anyone
envisioned before it was argued”).
7
Adam Liptak, From Case About 9/11, Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2009, at A10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thomas C. Goldstein).
8
See id. (reporting the remarks of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
9
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
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Although some have argued that concerns about the cost of litigation, especially discovery, are shaping these developments—the major10
11
ity suggested as much in both Twombly and Iqbal —this is not the
whole story. Many factors beyond litigation cost are influencing these
decisions. Judicial decisions at every level, including the Supreme
Court, have expressed a widespread and generalized “hostility to liti12
13
gation.” The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), for example, was enacted in order to move tort litigation from state to federal
courts, where defendants believe that they will get a more receptive
hearing. As the ideological predilections of federal judges have
shifted, many federal judges have expressed the view that employment
14
discrimination and civil rights cases are often weak and without merit.
Whatever the reasons, the greatest impact of this change in the
landscape of federal pretrial practice is the dismissal of civil rights and
employment discrimination cases from federal courts in disproportionate numbers. Fewer civil rights and employment cases are being
filed in the federal courts. These issues have become the subject of

10

The majority in Twombly suggests that the cost of litigation, and especially the
cost of discovery, prompted the Court’s decision, see 550 U.S. at 557-60, while the dissent points out that careful management of discovery and litigation costs can address
this problem without dismissing at the pleading stage, see id. at 584 n.18 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
11
In Iqbal, the majority also repeatedly emphasizes discovery costs. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (expressing concern with the “heavy costs”
imposed on the government by discovery).
12
See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1107 (2006)
(“In case after case and in wildly divergent areas of the law, the Rehnquist Court has
expressed a profound hostility to litigation.”).
13
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see
also GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 2-4 (2005) (noting that
a key purpose of CAFA was to prevent tort plaintiffs from blocking removal to federal
court). See generally Symposium, Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439 (2008) (discussing CAFA’s historical context and
impact).
14
See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61
LA. L. REV. 555, 557 (2001) (describing the unusual difficulty of proving employment
discrimination claims, and arguing that this difficulty results largely from judicial bias).
Although Selmi’s article focuses exclusively on employment discrimination, this Article
looks at both civil rights and employment discrimination cases. Some of the data cited
here cover both sets of cases and some cover only employment discrimination cases.
In the Administrative Office of the United States Courts’s data, on which many of the
studies rely, Code 442, “Civil Rights: Employment,” and Code 440, “Other Civil
Rights,” are the relevant categories. See Nature of Suit Codes, http://pacer.psc.usc
ourts.gov/documents/natsuit.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (listing federal suit
codes).
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15

national attention. In this Article, I examine the disparate impact
that the changing nature of pretrial practice has on civil rights and
employment discrimination cases. I argue that this serious effect raises important questions about purportedly “neutral” rules in the federal courts and should make us look closely at the impact of procedural
revision on civil rights and employment cases. In addition, it raises
larger questions about whether the swift termination of these cases in
federal court is disposing of meritorious cases and forces us to consider the implications of these cases going to state court.
There is a substantial literature about the heavy burdens that em16
ployment discrimination plaintiffs bear in federal court. But new developments in federal pretrial practice that reflect the strengthening
of “judicial gatekeeping”—such as Twombly, Iqbal, summary judgment,
and Daubert—appear to be having a considerable impact on employment discrimination and civil rights cases. Empirical studies of the effect of Twombly and Iqbal suggest that these decisions have resulted in
17
the disproportionate dismissal of civil rights cases. Recent data on
15

See Mary Pat Gallagher, Where Have All the Employment Cases Gone?, NAT’L L.J.,
Oct. 6, 2008, at S19 (discussing the drop in federal employment discrimination filings
and the possible causes of the drop).
16
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131-32 (2009)
[hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse] (analyzing updated data to find
that employment discrimination plaintiffs are filing fewer cases in federal court perhaps because they “now recogniz[e] their low chances for success”); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court,
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs] (finding that employment discrimination plaintiffs are less
successful than other litigants at the pretrial, trial, and appeal stages in federal court).
17
See Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (“[A] higher percentage of decisions . . . granted a motion to dismiss in the Title VII context when the
courts relied on Twombly.”); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A
Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (“The rate of dismissal in civil rights cases has spiked
in the four months since Twombly.”). More recently, Patricia Hatamyar has reviewed
1039 reported and unreported federal district court cases deciding motions to dismiss
and found that 46% of motions were granted under Conley, 48% of motions were
granted under Twombly, and 56% of motions were granted under Iqbal. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1487764. Additionally, she found that when courts apply the Twombly/Iqbal pleading
standard, the odds that courts will grant a motion to dismiss are 1.5 times greater than
under the Conley standard. Id. Hatamyar determined that constitutional civil rights
cases are the “largest category of cases in which 12(b)(6) motions are filed.” Id. She
concluded that motions to dismiss in constitutional civil rights cases were granted at a
higher rate (53%) than in cases overall (49%), and the rate of granting 12(b)(6) mo-

8 SCHNEIDER FINAL PRINT REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

2/1/2010 6:30 PM

The Impact of Pretrial Practice on Discrimination Cases

521

summary judgment in three district courts support this disparate im18
pact. And the most recent Federal Judicial Center study of summary
judgment, prepared in conjunction with the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules’s proposed amendment providing for a summary judgment
“point-counterpoint” format for movant and respondent, suggests that
the “prominent role” of summary judgment in civil rights and em19
ployment cases is “striking.”
I have recently explored some of these questions in the context of
20
summary judgment. But it is important to look at these issues more
broadly in light of the interrelated dimensions of federal pretrial practice. There is a widespread view that our federal civil litigation system
21
continues to be “transsubstantive,” with rules that apply the same way
to all types of actions. Each procedural dimension—pleading, discovery, Daubert motions, or summary judgment—is viewed as neutral, discrete, and operating independently of the others. Yet recent experience with the Civil Rules Committee’s proposed amendment to Rule
56, which would have mandated “point-counterpoint” summary judgment presentation as a presumptively uniform procedure for most
cases (ultimately rejected by the Committee) suggests the need for
close scrutiny of the operation of federal pretrial practice on civil
22
rights and employment cases on summary judgment. Many comtions in constitutional civil rights cases increased in the cases selected from Conley
(50%) to Twombly (55%) to Iqbal (60%). Id.
18
See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates over Time,
Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts
17-18 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-022, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138373 (finding that “summary judgment rates
in employment discrimination and other civil rights cases are consistently higher than
rates in contract and torts cases”).
19
Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael Baylson, 2-3 (Aug. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Cecil & Cort Memorandum], available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/insumjre.pdf/$file/insumjre.pdf. In this
Article, I refer to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules as the “Advisory Committee,”
the “Civil Rules Committee,” or the “Committee,” and the Standing Committee on
Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure as the “Standing Committee.”
20
See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal
Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 714-15 (2007) (analyzing the effect of summary judgment in gender cases and its tendency to “permit subtle bias to go unchecked”).
21
For a recent discussion of “transsubstantive” procedure, see Jenny S. Martinez,
Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (2008),
which examines the relationship between substance and procedure and the limits of
“transsubstantive” procedure in “war on terror” cases.
22
Comments submitted concerning the proposed “point-counterpoint” amendment to Rule 56(c) are available on the Rules comment website. Admin. Office of the
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mentators raised questions as to whether this purportedly purely “procedural” reform of the Rule would lead to increased grants of sum23
mary judgment and dismissals in civil rights and employment cases.
24
An amended Rule 56 became effective December 1, 2009.
In this Article, I analyze three discrete aspects of the shift in pretrial practice—pleading, summary judgment, and Daubert—in depth
and then assess their cumulative impact on civil rights and employment cases. My concern with this issue stems from my experience as a
civil rights litigator at a time when federal courts were viewed as the
bulwark of civil rights protection. I am sensitive to the historical dialectic between federal/state parity and civil rights preferences that
affect whether federal or state courts are the best venues for the reso25
lution of civil rights matters. Now, however, cases involving matters
of public importance are relegated to state courts, where judges are
subject to greater political pressure. Lawyers and judges now perceive
that state courts have become the forum for plaintiffs, while federal
26
courts are the forum for defendants.
U.S. Courts, 2008 Civil Rules Comment Chart, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
2008_Civil_Rules_Comments_Chart.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). Indeed, many
witnesses who testified at the Advisory Committee’s three public hearings, and many
comments that were submitted, focused on the potential deleterious impact of these
proposals on civil rights and employment cases as well. See infra Part II (discussing
“point-counterpoint”).
23
Several participants at the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules’s Mini-Conference
on Rule 56 in November 2007 had raised this issue. See Letter from Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Brooklyn Law Sch., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Nov. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008%20Comments%20Committee%20Folders/CV%
20Comments%202008/08-CV-049-Testimony-Schneider.pdf (noting that several participants at the conference expressed concern about the way the proposed rule would
operate and that academics and judges have underscored the dangers of summary
judgment with respect to civil rights and employment cases).
24
See Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules
of Practice and Procedure (May 8, 2009, revised June 15, 2009) [hereinafter Kravitz
Memorandum], in COMM. ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. at C-1 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/
Combined_ST_Report_Sept_2009.pdf.
25
Compare Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1977)
(arguing that federal courts are “institutionally preferable” to state courts “as forums in
which to raise federal constitutional claims”), with William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of
Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 599-600 (1999) (noting that gay litigants have
had greater success in state courts, which suggests that state courts might sometimes
have institutional advantages for disfavored clients).
26
See Gallagher, supra note 15 (noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers have attempted to
keep their cases in state courts because of the higher success rate there); Hurley, supra
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Part I of this Article begins with an overview of changes in federal
pretrial practice and a review of recent data on civil rights and employment cases in the federal courts. It then turns to the procedural
aspects of pleading and the history of special pleading burdens in civil
rights cases, which were rejected by the Supreme Court, and the impact of Twombly and Iqbal. This part then proceeds to discuss the procedural aspects of summary judgment, summary judgment decisionmaking in general and in civil rights and employment cases in
particular, the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on summary judgment,
and the problematic approach to summary judgment reflected in Scott
27
v. Harris. Part I concludes with a brief look at the procedural aspects
of Daubert motions, the way they are tied to summary judgment, and
their effect on civil rights and employment discrimination cases. Part
II examines the broader implications of these developments for federal pretrial practice, and focuses on the need for a close analysis of
the impact of “neutral” Rules, such as the proposed but rejected
“point-counterpoint” amendment to Rule 56, on employment discrimination and civil rights litigation. Part III explores why these changes
are occurring and considers what it would take to reverse this trend.
I. THE CHANGING NATURE OF PRETRIAL PRACTICE IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS
From our current vantage point, there have been tremendous
changes in federal pretrial practice over the last thirty years. These
changes include the development of heightened pleading standards,
the increased use of summary judgment, the development of Daubert
hearings, more settlements, the greater use of managerial judging,
and the disappearance of civil trials. Although each of these developments involve different sources of law and may be occurring for arguably different reasons, they are all interrelated. Some of these
changes—such as increased settlement and the disappearance of civil
trials—may be cumulative, the results of interaction among other developments.
This notion of interrelationship among parts is fundamental to
the operation of procedure under the Federal Rules. The idea of
simple notice pleading was integrally related to (and indeed interdependent with) provisions for extensive discovery and summary judgnote 6 (“Thanks to the U.S. Supreme Court[’s Iqbal decision], plaintiffs’ attorneys now
have to think twice before filing civil lawsuits in federal court.”).
27
550 U.S. 372 (2007).
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ment. The majorities’ rationales for heightening the burden of pleading in Twombly and Iqbal were to reduce the expense and duration of
discovery. Change in one aspect of the rules and the litigation process
inevitably impacts every other aspect of the process, although we do
not always know how. Yet we need to look at these changes in a systemic way. Stephen Yeazell has made this point:
Although we consciously chose the individual legal changes, we have
not entirely comprehended their combined effect. As a consequence,
we sometimes debate particular features—for example, styles of judging,
the virtues and vices of discovery, abuses of the legal system, alternatives
to litigation, and various docket-speeding local experiments—without
acknowledging their links to the system as a whole. We need a better
sense of these connections and a more comprehensive sense of how
28
process functions as a system.

Historically, federal courts were the place for civil rights relief.
Our vision of the federal courts over the last half century has been
shaped by the civil rights movement. Civil rights and employment
discrimination cases often raise issues of social importance and require a public forum. Public exposure of these cases legitimates stories of harm. The erasure of these cases from federal court makes the
cases and their histories invisible. Yet the impact of these various developments has been to dismiss these cases and take them out of federal court.
Between 1988 and 2003, the number of employment discrimination cases in federal court “rose in absolute numbers and as a propor29
tion of all civil litigation.” But today, it is widely recognized that employment discrimination and civil rights cases face enormous hurdles
in federal court. There is a considerable literature on this issue that
30
looks at all phases of the litigation process. In virtually every phase
28

Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 631, 632.
29
Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the Contemporary United States 13 (Am. Bar
Found. Research Paper Series No. 08-04, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=1093313. The authors describe 1988–2003 as a high point of employment
civil rights enforcement because “protections against employment discrimination were
extended to older workers, the disabled, and those in need of family and medical
leave”; sexual harassment was recognized as a violation of Title VII in 1986; the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the right to damages and to jury trial; and the
Americans with Disabilities Act was passed in 1992. Id.
30
See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16 (describing data
on employment discrimination plaintiffs’ lack of success in federal trial and appellate
courts); Selmi, supra note 14, at 559-60 (providing data on civil rights and employment
plaintiffs’ low success rates in federal court).
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of the process, now ranging from pleading to appeals, there appears
to be a disparate impact on employment discrimination and civil
rights cases.
In their pioneering 2004 study on employment discrimination
cases in federal court, Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab rely on data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts beginning in
31
1970. They conclude that
[e]mployment discrimination plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe. They
manage many fewer happy resolutions early in litigation, and so they
have to proceed toward trial more often. They win a lower proportion of
cases during pretrial and at trial. Then, more of their successful cases
are appealed. On appeal, they have a harder time upholding their suc32
cesses and reversing adverse outcomes.

Clermont and Schwab have recently updated this study, looking at five
33
more years of current data from the same source. In this new article,
they argue that matters have changed for the worse for employment
34
discrimination plaintiffs. They report a “startling drop” in the number of employment discrimination cases in federal court: the category
of employment discrimination cases “has dropped in absolute number
of terminations every year after fiscal year 1999, and it has dropped as
35
a percentage of the docket every year after fiscal year 2001.” In 1997,
employment discrimination was the largest single category of civil liti36
gation cases in federal court. By 2006, employment discrimination
cases accounted for less than 6% of the federal civil docket (from 10%
37
five years before) and were no longer the largest category of cases.
Clermont and Schwab conclude that judicial bias at all levels of the litigation process may be discouraging litigants and lawyers from pur38
suing these cases in the federal courts.

31

Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, supra note 16 (discussing the special difficulties employment discrimination plaintiffs face because of judicial bias).
32
Id. at 429.
33
Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16, at 103.
34
Id. at 131 (“Maybe the situation has not gone from bad to worse in the last five
years. But those plaintiffs may have gone from merely faring badly to feeling bad
about their chances for success, which would affect their litigation behavior.”).
35
Id. at 104.
36
Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, supra note 16, at 437 fig.4.
37
Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16, at 117.
38
Id. at 104-05 (“The fear of judicial bias at both the lower and appellate court
levels may be discouraging potential employment discrimination plaintiffs from seeking relief in the federal courts.”).
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Their statistics are indeed startling. Between 1979 and 2006, the
plaintiff win rate in federal court for “jobs cases” (15%) was dramati39
cally lower than for “nonjobs cases” (51%). During that same time
period, employment discrimination plaintiffs won only 3.59% of pretrial adjudications, while other plaintiffs won 21.05% of pretrial adju40
dications. On appeal, there was a 41% reversal rate of plaintiff wins
in job cases at the district court level but only a 9% reversal rate of de41
fendant wins in those cases at the district court level.
Although
Clermont and Schwab emphasize that this phenomenon shapes pretrial dispositions, settlement, trial, and appeals, this Article focuses on
the formal aspects of pretrial practice.
Settlement is another locus of disparate impact. Settlement is always lurking in the background of pretrial practice and often results
after a ruling on summary judgment. A recent study on settlement in
federal trial courts by Theodore Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers
suggests that employment discrimination cases settle less frequently
than other kinds of cases and that at least part of the reason for such
42
“poorer performance” is in-court treatment. They observe that
[t]he pattern of employment case outcomes persists from the pretrial
stage through the appellate stage. Employment cases have fewer early
terminations than other cases, a much lower plaintiff win rate on pretrial
motions than other cases, a much lower plaintiff win rate at trial than
other cases, a much lower win rate in judge trials than in jury trials of
employment cases, a higher trial rate than other cases, a strong anti43
plaintiff effect on appeal, and a diving number of filings.

I turn now to the major aspects of pretrial litigation: pleading,
summary judgment, and Daubert.

39

Id. at 127.
Id. at 128.
41
Id. at 110 display 2.
42
Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 145 (2009).
43
Id. A recent study of settlement rates drawing on data from federal cases in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia suggests that settlement rates in employment discrimination cases are among the lowest of those case
categories studied. See id. at 135 (noting that the settlement rate of employment discrimination cases in the two districts from 2001–2002 was “relatively low” compared to
other case categories, including tort and contract); see also Vivian Berger, Michael O.
Finkelstein & Kenneth Cheung, Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment
Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 50-67 (2005) (studying summary judgment motion dispositions in district courts of the Second Circuit in order to
identify the factors that parties to an employment discrimination case should consider
when estimating a case’s expected settlement value).
40
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A. Pleading
The traditional view is that the Federal Rules established notice
pleading. Rule 8 provides for “a short and plain statement of the
44
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In Conley v. Gibson, the Court stated that a complaint should not be dismissed unless
the plaintiff “can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
45
would entitle him to relief.” For fifty years, Conley meant that Rule
12(b)(6) motions were disfavored. The only type of claim for which the
Federal Rules required a higher burden of pleading was Rule 9(b) fraud.
Otherwise, notice pleading was the rule as a transsubstantive matter.
Beginning in the early 1990s, however, some district court judges
began to challenge the assumption of notice pleading in civil rights
cases because of their own views of these cases. They wrote decisions
requiring a higher burden of pleading in civil rights cases, dismissing
46
the cases on 12(b)(6) grounds. But in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the
47
Supreme Court rejected this effort. One reason for the Court’s rejection was that district courts had sought to carve out this higher
burden of pleading in civil rights cases on their own through case law,
even though the Rules were intended to be transsubstantive.
In Twombly, a 2007 antitrust case, the Court wrote an opinion that
48
started a revolution in pleading and the federal civil litigation system.
In rejecting the longstanding rule of Conley v. Gibson, the Court ruled
that pleading allegations had to be “plausible” and emphasized the
importance of judicial gatekeeping where heavy litigation costs were a
49
threat. The standard of Conley v. Gibson, the Court ruled, “ha[d]

44

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
46
See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165 (1993) (reversing the district court’s application of a “heightened pleading standard” to a § 1983 claim). See generally Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed
Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 935, 939 (1990) (examining courts’ increasing demand that civil rights
complaints meet a stricter pleading standard).
47
See 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without
regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits.”).
48
See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems,
95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2010) (manuscript at 12-13), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1448796 (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal establish an invented test
for pleading that is novel, unpredictable, and disruptive and that generally destabilizes
the federal civil litigation system).
49
550 U.S. at 559.
45
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50

earned its retirement.”
Since Twombly, judges, lawyers, and legal
51
scholars have debated the meaning of the Court’s holding. The case
has been widely cited, and there has been considerable scholarly dis52
cussion of the implications of the decision. Discussion initially focused on whether the Supreme Court intended the case to reach
53
pleading generally or whether it was limited to antitrust cases. The
2009 Iqbal decision makes clear that Twombly set out a general pleading standard and is not limited to antitrust cases.
54
Iqbal, a five-to-four decision, fully overturns Conley v. Gibson. Iqbal
was a Bivens civil rights claim alleging discriminatory detention and
55
treatment of a man of Pakistani descent after 9/11. The decision is
very broad, rejects the concept of notice pleading, and requires the
district court to determine whether there is a “plausible” claim based
on the facts alleged in the complaint and the substantive law. Iqbal
50

Id. at 563.
For example, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam), decided after Twombly, seems to suggest a more liberal pleading standard when the plaintiff is a pro se litigant.
52
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 81-99 (2007) (arguing
that the Twombly standard should not govern cases in which public facts do not negate
the thrust of a complaint but should apply when the “defendant has negated all inferences of culpability”); Seiner, supra note 17, at 1015, 1026-53 (arguing that “courts
should exercise great caution before applying Twombly too rigidly” in employment discrimination cases and proposing a uniform framework by which to evaluate the sufficiency of Title VII complaints); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 431, 431 (2008) (criticizing Twombly as a decision that allows “the interests of protecting defendants against expensive discovery and managing burdensome caseloads . . . to prevail over the interests of access and resolution on the merits”); Suja A.
Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1878
(2008) (arguing that the decision in Twombly violates the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a citizen’s right to a jury trial); Hannon, supra note 17, at 1835-46 (providing
an empirical study of Twombly’s effect on the role of dismissals in district court cases
and concluding that its immediate impact has been on civil rights cases).
53
See e.g., Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 138 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/
07/09/dodson.pdf (arguing that the “plausibility” standard is absolute and not restricted to antitrust cases); Spencer, supra note 52, at 457 (stating affirmatively that
“Twombly is not merely an antitrust case”); Thomas, supra note 52, at 1888 (stating that
the Twombly ruling affects more than just antitrust cases); Mary J. Hackett & Patricia E.
Antezana, All but Two Circuits Interpret ‘ Twombly’ Broadly, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 27, 2008, at
S3 (“Federal circuit courts of appeals across the country have, for the most part, embraced the new Twombly standard in all types of cases.”).
54
See Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly
expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and
discrimination suits alike.” (citation omitted)).
55
Id. at 1943.
51
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now requires plaintiffs to come forward with concrete facts at the outset of a lawsuit and instructs district judges to dismiss lawsuits that rest
on implausible legal claims.
It is important to look closely at the language of Iqbal to discern
what the Court now requires from pleading. In his majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy writes:
As the Court held in Twombly, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands
more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further
factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement” but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it
does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals
observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense. . . .
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are
no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then deter56
mine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

56

Id. at 1949-50 (citations omitted).
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Justice Kennedy’s characterization of what a district court should
do stands in sharp contrast to Justice Souter’s account in his Iqbal dissent. Justice Souter authored the majority opinion in Twombly. In
analyzing the complaint in Iqbal, Souter criticizes defendants Ashcroft
and Mueller’s claim that Iqbal’s allegations were “implausible” because such high-ranking officials “tend not to be personally involved
in the specific actions of lower-level officers down the bureaucratic
57
chain of command.” He goes on to spell out the following:
[T]his response bespeaks a fundamental misunderstanding of the enquiry that Twombly demands. Twombly does not require a court at the
motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual allegations are
probably true. We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be. The sole exception to
this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we
know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or ex58
periences in time travel. That is not what we have here.

Thus, Justice Souter’s view of the district court’s task in reviewing factual allegations in the complaint dramatically differs from the majori59
ty. It is significant that Justice Kennedy’s opinion emphasizes that
“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
60
and common sense.” Presumably, the Court intended to emphasize
that the district court should explicitly apply these factors to the assessment of whether the plaintiff’s pleading is plausible. But reliance
on “judicial experience” and “common sense” necessarily adds a more
subjective element to a district court’s assessment of whether a plaintiff’s claim should go forward. As Stephen Burbank has observed, this
aspect of the Iqbal decision “obviously licenses highly subjective judgments. . . . This is a blank check for federal judges to get rid of cases
61
Further, the new heightened pleading standard
they disfavor.”
seems to render summary judgment irrelevant because district judges

57

Id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
59
The murky distinction between factual and legal allegations in the 12(b)(6)
context haunts this decision. Justice Kennedy writes, “Although for purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we
are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id.
at 1949-50 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60
Id. at 1950.
61
Liptak, supra note 7, at A10 (quoting Stephen Burbank).
58
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can now simply dismiss cases on Rule 12(b)(6) motions and not wait
62
for summary judgment.
What is breathtaking is that the Court made these changes on its
own in light of Conley and Rule 8. Rule 8 was not amended; Congress
did not pass a statute changing pleading standards. The Court
changed federal pleading standards for all cases, despite prior decisions such as Swierkiewicz, in which the Court explicitly rejected the notion that pleading requirements in civil rights and employment cases
63
should change. The Court also ignored the rulemaking process that
64
is in place for procedural reform of federal civil litigation. Indeed,
scholars and practitioners have been so outraged by Iqbal that Senator
Arlen Specter has now submitted a bill, the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, which would reverse Iqbal and Twombly and reinstate
65
Conley’s “no set of facts” standard as the prevailing pleading standard.
Scholars have proposed alternative language for bills that might ac66
complish the same result. A hearing in the House of Representatives, entitled Access to Justice Denied: Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, was
held by the Judiciary Committee in October 2009. Professor Arthur
Miller and representatives of civil rights organizations testified concerning the devastating impact of Iqbal on access to the federal courts,

62

See Michael C. Dorf, Should Congress Change the Standard for Dismissing a Federal
Lawsuit?, FINDLAW, July 29, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20090729.html.
See generally Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly (Oct. 27, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1494683.
63
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (rejecting heightened
pleading standards).
64
Id. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 48 (manuscript at 32-33) (discussing Twombly
and Iqbal’s potentially disruptive effect on the process for procedural reform that has
developed since the promulgation of the Rules in 1938). In Jones v. Bock, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote, just a few months before Twombly was decided, that “adopting different
and more onerous pleading rules to deal with particular categories of cases should be
done through established rulemaking procedures, and not on a case-by-case basis by
the courts.” 549 U.S. 199, 224 (2007).
65
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) (as introduced in the Senate by Senator Specter, July 22, 2009). S. 1504 would “provide that
Federal courts shall not dismiss complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Conley v. Gibson.” Id. (italics added); see also Tony Mauro, Groups
Unite to Keep Cases on the Docket: Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Seek to Stop Dismissals After Iqbal Decision, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 1 (detailing efforts taken by plaintiff’s lawyers to
overturn the Iqbal and Twombly decisions).
66
Dorf, supra note 62 (analyzing the difficulties of amending Twombly via legislation).
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and on employment discrimination cases and civil rights cases in
67
particular.
After Twombly, several empirical studies of district court judicial interpretation of the case suggested that it had led to dismissals of civil
68
rights and employment cases. The first study examined cases on
Westlaw that were brought under Title VII and district court decisions
on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim in the year after
69
Twombly and compared the numbers with cases prior to Twombly.
The author concluded that Twombly “has already made the pleading
requirements more difficult (and certainly more confusing) for Title
VII litigants” and that the district courts are aggressively using the Supreme Court’s recent decision to “rais[e] the bar as to what an employment discrimination plaintiff must plead” to survive dismissal of
70
employment discrimination claims. The second study, conducted by
a law student, examined all cases found through Westlaw searches that
cited Twombly from June 2007 to December 2007, the first seven
71
months after the decision. From the 3287 district court cases sampled, a civil rights action citing Twombly was 39.6% more likely to be
72
dismissed than a random case selected from the set.
These preliminary findings raised significant questions. First, district judges applying Twombly did not appear to limit the decision to,
or, indeed, even apply it to, the very factual context in which it
73
arose—antitrust claims. Second, judges appeared to be interpreting
67

Access to Justice Denied: Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal Before the H. Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2009). The Hearing was chaired by Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY). The witnesses included: Arthur R. Miller, Professor, New York University School of Law; Gregory Katsas, Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department
of Justice; John Vail, Senior Litigation Counsel and Vice President, Center for Constitutional Litigation; and Debo P. Adegbile, Associate Director of Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.
68
Seiner, supra note 17, at 1026-31 (discussing the higher rate of employment
discrimination dismissals in cases relying on Twombly); Hannon, supra note 17, at 1837
(noting the pronounced increase in dismissals of civil rights complaints post-Twombly).
69
See Seiner, supra note 17, at 1027-29 (describing in full the methodology used to
perform the study of Twombly’s effect on motions to dismiss).
70
Id. at 1037-38.
71
For a discussion of the methodology utilized in the study, see Hannon, supra
note 17 at 1828-35.
72
See id. at 1838.
73
See id. at 1814-15 (stating that an empirical study of Twombly’s effect demonstrates its application to “every substantive area of law governed by Rule 8”); Seiner,
supra note 17, at 1013 (“Though Twombly arose in the context of an antitrust case, its
holding has already been extended by the lower courts to other areas of the law.”).
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the decision vigorously and disproportionately to dismiss civil rights
and employment discrimination cases. Indeed, Iqbal itself is a civil
rights case in which the pleading issue relates to government immuni74
ty. These statistics also raise doubts about the rationale the majority
gives in Twombly for imposing a higher burden of pleading in civil
rights cases—the cost of discovery. Since most civil rights and employment discrimination cases in the federal courts are individual cases and not cases that involve group litigation or class actions, it seems
unlikely that concern over the cost of discovery is animating these
judicial decisions.
Since Iqbal, there have been many district court (and even some
75
circuit court) decisions but only limited empirical data. A review of
the many district and circuit court decisions that have already interpreted Iqbal is astonishing. Twombly and Iqbal have transformed the
analytic work the district judge has to do at the pleading stage. Rule
12(b)(6) decisionmaking is now extraordinarily complex, fact- and
law-intensive, and lengthy. District courts are now forced to write detailed analyses of both the plaintiff’s factual claims and of the legal
sufficiency of those claims. Plaintiffs are required to produce a considerable degree of factual detail at the very beginning of the lawsuit
before they have been able to conduct any discovery. Further, judges
have to parse the factual and legal claims and analyze the merits of
these legal claims at the nascent stages of the lawsuit. Moreover, de76
spite Swierkiewicz, the emerging picture suggests that, like Twombly,
Iqbal has strengthened district court discretion to dismiss civil rights
and employment cases. I turn to some of these cases in order to illustrate the problems faced by district court judges under Iqbal.
In many cases, defendants’ 12(b)(6) motions have been granted.
For example, in Williams v. City of Cleveland the district court dismissed
a § 1983 claim against the City of Cleveland for false arrest and prose77
cution. In dismissing the claim, the district judge held that the

74

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (discussing the plausibility
standard that complaints must meet to survive a 12(b)(6) motion in the context of a
detainee’s civil rights action against high-ranking governmental officials).
75
As of September 21, 2009, a Westlaw search produced 1500 district court and
100 appellate court opinions. Mauro, supra note 65, at 31 (showing that “Iqbal motions” to dismiss have already become commonplace in federal courts); see also Hatamyar, supra note 17.
76
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (ruling that there was
not a higher standard of pleading in employment discrimination cases).
77
No. 1:09-1310, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61346, at *11 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 2009).
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[p]laintiff must allege facts, which if true, demonstrate the City’s policy,
such as examples of past situations where law enforcement officials have
been instructed to ignore evidence. . . . [Plaintiff] has not alleged facts
from which it can be inferred that this conduct is recurring or that what
78
happened in his case was due to City policy.

However, without discovery, complaints like these can easily be dismissed. The court granted the motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, citing the complaint’s conclusory manner
79
and lack of specific factual allegations.
In Jones v. Town of Milo, the plaintiff sued when she lost her job as
80
Milo Town Manager after seventeen years of service. The plaintiff
alleged that while working for the defendant, she had never received
an evaluation rating her performance as less than “excellent” until her
81
final year. Magistrate Judge Kravchuk recommended dismissal of the
complaint based on Iqbal, stating that courts may not “indulge an inference exposing the defendant to liability . . . when the factual allegations support a more likely inferential finding that is incompatible
82
with liability.” The magistrate judge determined that the plaintiff
failed to allege facts necessary to state a disqualifying claim for a due
83
process violation. Similarly, in Snavely v. Arnold, the plaintiff, a former police officer, brought a § 1983 claim against city officials for vi84
olating his First Amendment rights. The court dismissed the complaint, noting that the plaintiff had failed to include specific words or
85
conduct that would constitute protected free speech.
In Rivera v. Prince William County School Board, a plaintiff brought a
86
Title VII hostile work environment claim. The plaintiff alleged that
her co-worker made comments about her sexual relationship with her
husband, offered to buy the plaintiff lingerie for Christmas, and asked
87
whether she would wear lingerie for her husband or for him. She
also alleged that he would use sexual innuendo to refer to male genitalia, that she received e-mail making sexual references, and that her

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at *12.
Id.
No. 09-80, 2009 WL 1605409, at *1 (D. Me. June 5, 2009).
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6-8.
No. 1:08-12165, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51415, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2009).
Id. at *5.
No 1:09-341, 2009 WL 2232746, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 22, 2009).
Id. at *2.
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88

co-worker smacked her behind.
In reviewing the defendant’s
12(b)(6) motion, the district court noted that complaints relying on
89
“naked assertions devoid of further enhancement” are insufficient
and that the claims presented must allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct al90
leged. The court “sliced and diced” the plaintiff’s allegations, saying
that the harassment had only spanned seventeen months and involved
only four instances of sexual harassment, clearly minimizing the harm
that the plaintiff claimed.
Several district court opinions have, in employment discrimination cases, considered Swierkiewicz and puzzled over the particular im91
pact of Iqbal on Swierkiewicz. District courts have repeatedly cited the
language of Iqbal, and several circuits have already disagreed on this
issue. District courts have suggested that “threadbare recitals of the
elements of the cause of action” do not suffice to state a claim, often
92
finding complaints “conclusory.”
There are also numerous employment and civil rights cases in
which district courts have granted leave to amend. The process of
amending complaints could go on for a long time and be very timeconsuming and expensive. Iqbal has opened the door to minute and
searching judicial analysis of each factual and legal allegation in the
complaint.
Despite approval of Iqbal in many lower courts, some judges have
expressed hostility to the decision. In a transcript on a 12(b)(6) mo93
tion in Madison v. City of Chicago, Judge Milton Shadur chided the defendant for treating the Twombly and Iqbal standard as a “universal ‘get
94
out of jail free’ card.” Judge Shadur expressed special concern with
the way Twombly and Iqbal will be interpreted in employment discrimination cases. He suggested that the Supreme Court had adopted a

88

Id.
Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).
90
Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
91
See, e.g., Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, No. 07-4285, 2009 WL 2501662 (3d Cir.
Aug. 18, 2009); Kabil v. Youngblood, No. 1:08-00281, 2009 WL 2475006 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
11, 2009); Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09-245, 2009 WL
2424608 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009); Oshop v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. 3:090063, 2009 WL 1651479 (M.D. Tenn. June 10, 2009).
92
Oshop, 2009 WL 1651479, at *6.
93
Transcript of Proceedings at 2, Madison v. City of Chicago, No. 09-3629 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 10, 2009).
94
Id. at 2.
89
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“fact-pleading regime rather than the notice-pleading regime that the
95
federal courts operate under.” Judge Shadur was unwilling to grant
the motion and ordered the parties to begin discovery with the re96
quired advance disclosures. He admonished defense counsel regarding Iqbal:
Well, you know defense counsel—how will I characterize it? You ask if
it’s new. It’s Pavlovian. You know, the bell has rung and defense counsel salivates. They say, “Wow! Here is our chance to dump a lot of cases.” . . . But you see employment discrimination cases have a long history
of confirmation by our Court of Appeals and others that say that all you
have to [do] is to say, “I was discriminated on based on my sex” and
identify the . . . adverse employment action. In that case, that’s what dis97
covery is really for.

Other judges have also resisted Iqbal. In Chao v. Ballista, the plaintiff brought a claim against the supervisors of a prison for failure to
98
investigate and prevent sexual abuse under § 1983. She alleged that
while she was an inmate, she had between 50 and 100 sexual encounters with one of the defendants and that the same defendant had a
99
sexual relationship with another female inmate. The defendants argued that the plaintiff failed to allege “the personal involvement of
100
Judge Nancy Gertner determined that the
supervisory officials.”
plaintiff’s allegations were plausible enough for the court to infer that
the sexual abuse could have been prevented had better policies and
101
procedures been implemented.
Twombly and Iqbal have effectively commanded district judges to
assess pleadings and the credibility of plaintiffs’ allegations as though
they were summary judgment motions. As we see in the next Section,
summary judgment decisionmaking has been problematic and controversial. For a district judge to be called on to make a similar assessment on pleading, based on “judicial experience” and “common
sense” and before discovery, is absurd.

95

Id. at 3.
Id. at 10.
97
Id. at 11-12.
98
630 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D. Mass. 2009).
99
Id. at 177-78.
100
Id. at 173-74.
101
Id. at 174.
96
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B. Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and Scott
There has been considerable change over the years in summary
102
judgment practice before the federal courts.
Rule 56 provides that
summary judgment can only be granted if there is “no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
103
matter of law.” Historically, summary judgment was disfavored and
was not to be granted liberally because of the preference for jury trial.
Cases that presented issues of credibility and weight of evidence were
deemed inappropriate for summary judgment.
However, the trilogy of Supreme Court decisions in 1986—
104
105
106
Matsushita, Liberty Lobby, and Celotex —provided impetus and encouragement to district courts to grant summary judgment more fre107
quently. Federal trial judges are now more likely to grant summary
108
judgment, thereby depriving litigants of the opportunity to have

102

The discussions of summary judgment in this Section and of Daubert in the next
Section draw heavily on my article, The Dangers of Summary Judgment. Schneider, supra
note 20. See generally Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897
(1998) (tracing the historical development of Rule 56).
103
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
104
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)
(holding that a party opposing summary judgment cannot succeed merely by casting
“metaphysical doubt” about material facts and that policy implications and factual context can increase the nonmovant’s burden).
105
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (holding that, in
motive cases, as in others, the party opposing summary judgment must provide affirmative evidence to defeat a Rule 56 motion).
106
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding that a movant
need only show that the party opposing summary judgment lacks sufficient evidence
to prevail).
107
Some scholars argue that the trilogy merely reflected changes that were already
taking place with respect to summary judgment practice and that the cases did not
cause those changes. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in
Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
591, 620 (2004) (asserting that the rise in case termination often attributed to the 1986
case trilogy began during the 1970s). One empirical study of federal court summary
judgment practice over the last twenty-five years “call[s] into question the interpretation that the trilogy led to expansive increases in summary judgment.” Joe S. Cecil et
al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 862 (2007). There is, however, no dispute that the trilogy has
encouraged district judges to view summary judgment as an appropriate and important
vehicle to dispose of cases. For a full discussion of the history of summary judgment,
see Burbank, supra, at 594-603, and Wald, supra note 102, at 1898-1917.
108
See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1133 (2003) (arguing that courts value efficiency over
litigants’ rights to jury trials). Judge Patricia Wald has also noted this phenomenon:
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their claims resolved on a full factual record before a jury (and the
chance to have the merits of their claims determined by a more diverse group of decisionmakers). For this reason, the federal “sum109
mary judgment industry” has been the subject of much recent scho110
larly attention.
Increasing concern with the “vanishing trial” in
111
federal civil cases makes summary judgment a particularly important
My review of the D.C. Circuit’s summary judgment rulings over a six-month
period suggests that judges will stretch to make summary judgment apply even
in borderline cases which, a decade ago, might have been thought indisputably trial-worthy. It also suggests that appellate courts will, by and large, uphold
these dispositions, unless they think the trial judge got the law wrong.
Wald, supra note 102, at 1942.
109
See Milton I. Shadur, From the Bench: Trial or Tribulations (Rule 56 Style)?, LITIG.,
Winter 2003, at 5, 5 (2003) (“[T]he growth of the summary judgment industry [is] a
replacement for the civil trial.”).
110
See Miller, supra note 108, at 984-85 (arguing that current summary judgment
practices threaten the right to a jury trial); Wald, supra note 102, at 1898 (examining
the changes to summary judgment over its six-decade history); see also John Bronsteen,
Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522-27 (2007) (arguing that
summary judgment costs more than it saves); Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings,
Summary Judgment, and Judicial Discretion, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93, 112-20 (2005)
(analyzing the impact of summary judgment timing on patent litigation); Burbank,
supra note 107, at 591-92 (exploring summary judgment from “historical, empirical,
and normative perspectives”); Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91,
91-95 (2002) (debating whether judges may or should be able to deny summary judgment even when it is technically appropriate); Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, In Summary
It Makes Sense: A Proposal to Substantially Expand the Role of Summary Judgment in Nonjury
Cases, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 319, 320-21 (2006) (explaining how the typical concerns
regarding summary judgment are not present in a bench trial); Martin H. Redish,
Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1329, 1331 (2005) (suggesting an expansion of courts’ ability to “reach the merits of summary judgment” and a “more tempered approach to the actual summary
judgment decision”); Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering
Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 8286 (2006) (reexamining Celotex to align it with prior cases, the text of Rule 56, and its
own conflicting rationales); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional,
93 VA. L. REV. 139, 140-45 (2007) (claiming that summary judgment, as currently used,
violates the Seventh Amendment).
111
In December 2003, the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Litigation
convened a meeting of federal and state judges, law professors, and lawyers to discuss
the “vanishing trial” in both civil and criminal cases. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, but Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at 1 (examining the
decreasing proportion of trials and discussing several viewpoints on the decrease); see
also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (tracing the decline in the proportion and number of cases terminated by trial); John Lande, Introduction to Vanishing Trial Symposium, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 5 (explaining the causes of
changing trial patterns, speculating about the effect of such changes, and recommending improvements); Margo Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know About
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subject of inquiry. Because of the current importance of summary
judgment in federal civil litigation, the Advisory Committee on Civil
112
Rules has just spent several years revising Rule 56.
Summary judgment has played a major role in federal civil litiga113
tion.
For plaintiffs, summary judgment is the place of “do or die.”
Summary judgment lurks over pleading, Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss, Rule 11, discovery, and mediation or dispute resolution if the
114
case is diverted to a “neutral third party,” for the question is always
what will happen on summary judgment. It impacts and intertwines
with every aspect of litigation—alternative dispute resolution (ADR),

American Trial Trends, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 35, 38-39 (proposing areas for future investigation of the “vanishing trial” trend). Ironically, this project led to the development
of the new ABA Principles Relating to Juries and Jury Trials. See Terry Carter, The Verdict on Juries, 91 A.B.A. J. 40, 42 (describing the recommendations). Legal commentators have recently taken note of these developments. See Adam Liptak, Cases Keep Flowing In, but the Jury Pool Is Idle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A14 (noting a significant
decrease in the proportion of cases going to trial).
112
As of December 1, 2009, the recently amended Rule 56 reads as follows:
(a) By a Claiming Party. A party claiming relief may move, with or without
supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim.
(b) By a Defending Party. A party against whom relief is sought may move,
with or without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of
the claim.
(c) Time for a Motion, Response, and Reply; Proceedings.
(1) These times apply unless a different time is set by local rule or the court
orders otherwise:
(A) a party may move for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after
the close of all discovery;
(B) a party opposing the motion must file a response within 21 days after the
motion is served or a responsive pleading is due, whichever is later; and
(C) the movant may file a reply within 14 days after the response is served.
(2) The judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
113
See Burbank, supra note 107, at 594-603 (discussing the history of summary
judgment). For a general overview of summary judgment, see EDWARD J. BRUNET &
MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 2006).
Judge Patrick Higginbotham has noted the change in the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts’s definition of “trial,” which now includes “any contested matter in which
the judge takes evidence.” Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial
Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2002).
114
See Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 43, at 46 (describing the value of
mediation in employment actions).
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pleading, discovery, and trial. The threat of summary judgment
shapes settlement even in advance of a motion being filed. And when
summary judgment is denied, lawyers and judges report that defendants immediately offer to settle, often with far more generous settlement offers than they might have otherwise considered. A shift in
115
power from plaintiffs to defendants is the result.
But as I suggested in the prior Section, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal now raise serious questions as to
whether summary judgment will continue to play this central role in
federal pretrial practice. Since the ball has been moved forward to
pleading, and a district court can simply grant a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, summary judgment may become less central. With Iqbal, the Court
is ruling that there is no need for discovery, and the case ends at a very
early stage—a stage that was not contemplated by the Federal Rules.
Although Iqbal’s impact on pleading may be dramatic, it is important to emphasize how controversial even granting dismissals on
summary judgment—a much later stage in the litigation where there
has already been discovery—has been in the federal courts. In 1998,
Judge Patricia Wald, former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, expressed
concern about the development and direction of summary judgment
116
in the federal courts. She emphasized the importance of
ensuring that summary judgment stays within its proper boundaries, rather than encouraging its unimpeded growth. Its expansion across subject matter boundaries and its frequent conversion from a careful calculus of factual disputes (or the lack thereof) to something more like a
gestalt verdict based on an early snapshot of the case have turned it into
a potential juggernaut which, if not carefully monitored, could threaten
117
the relatively small residue of civil trials that remain.

Other scholars have also been critical of the “new” summary
118
119
Some recent schojudgment, and some have proposed reforms.
115

See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 100-03 (1990) (examining how summary judgment affects
the settlement process); see also Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
25 REV. LITIG. 79, 89-90 (2006) (arguing that the burden of production is systematically biased against plaintiffs).
116
Wald, supra note 102, at 1917.
117
Id.
118
See generally Miller, supra note 108 (arguing that judges often place too much
weight on judicial efficiency and not enough on litigants’ right to a jury trial).
119
See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 107, at 623 (“Unless the rules for determining
when an issue of fact is triable are determinate and enforced, summary judgment as an
equilibrating device is bound to get out of balance somewhere.”); Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 110, at 125-30 (proposing a cost-benefit analysis for the denial of sum-
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larship has proposed that summary judgment should be abolished on
the ground that it is unconstitutional as a violation of the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial, or simply on the ground that it is inef120
121
ficient. There are, of course, other views. But summary judgment
may now play less of a role in federal pretrial practice because of Iqbal.
While the Supreme Court’s recent procedure decisions underscore
122
the Court’s enthusiasm for and endorsement of summary judgment,
pleading has now moved to the fore.
The Civil Rules Committee’s work over several years on proposals
to amend Rule 56 suggests the recent importance of summary judg123
ment in federal civil litigation.
The amended Rule 56, which became effective December 1, 2009, has made some significant changes
in summary judgment practice. While the impact of these changes on
civil rights and employment discrimination cases may be more subtle
than the “point-counterpoint” proposal—which the Advisory Committee rejected in part because of concern about how it would impact civil rights or employment cases in light of opposition from scholars and

mary judgment); Redish, supra note 110, at 1355-57 (rejecting the idea that absolute
judicial discretion in granting summary judgment is needed).
120
See Bronsteen, supra note 110, at 527-38 (reasoning that, without summary
judgment, many disputes would settle earlier rather than going to trial, if those were
the only two options); Miller, supra note 108, at 1110-14 (questioning the “efficiency”
justification for summary judgment—though stopping short of calling for its abolition);
Thomas, supra note 110, at 140-45 (arguing that summary judgment not only violates the
Seventh Amendment, but also imposes substantial costs on the judicial system).
121
District Judge Shira Scheindlin has approached summary judgment more sympathetically and questioned the assumption that juries, not judges, should be evaluating sexual harassment cases. See Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and
Sexual Harassment, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 813, 852 (1999) (“For all their virtues, juries
cannot contribute much to the effort to define sexual harassment better—by granting
summary judgment in proper cases and carefully reviewing jury findings, however,
judges can.”); see also Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (2004) (proposing a new mandatory summary judgment procedure at the beginning of a lawsuit to
dispose of “nuisance-value” claims).
122
In both Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Supreme Court confirmed the importance of summary judgment. In Twombly, the Court suggested a heightened standard of pleading for Rule
12(b)(6) motions that would result in dismissal of cases even earlier than summary
judgment. See supra Section I.A. In Scott, the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court’s denial of summary judgment in a § 1983 action involving a claim for damages
against the police for a car chase. 550 U.S. at 386. The Court watched a video of the
chase and found that there was no need for a jury determination. Id. at 379-81; see also
infra Section I.B.
123
See supra note 112 (reprinting the proposed amendment to Rule 56).
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the plaintiff, civil rights, and employment bars—the new Rule will
124
need to be closely watched.
Even with Iqbal, summary judgment deserves continuing attention
and analysis as part of the larger picture of federal pretrial practice.
Although, ironically, much of the Advisory Committee’s work over
several years of drafting amendments to Rule 56 occurred before Iqbal
was decided (and may have made summary judgment less central),
there will still be cases not dismissed at pleading that will go on to discovery and summary judgment. Summary judgment is necessarily a
very case-, fact-, and law-specific determination. Summary judgment
decisionmaking at the trial level and review of grants of summary
judgment at the appellate level involve subtle assessments of the
strength of the plaintiff’s case based on what may be a very abbreviated record of discovery. Traditional application of summary judgment meant that judges should not grant it if there were material issues of fact in dispute, for issues of fact and credibility were to be
assessed by the jury. These days, however, federal judges—spurred on
by the Supreme Court, pressure to clear dockets, and perhaps even
dislike of or discomfort with certain claims (whether employment discrimination, sexual harassment, or Family Medical Leave Act cases)—
grant summary judgment regularly. Summary judgment decisionmaking necessarily involves a tremendous amount of discretion, and discretion can be the locus of hidden discrimination.
Why is the grant of summary judgment a problem? The first reason is that it ends the case for the plaintiff: the plaintiff does not have
the opportunity for a jury trial (in those cases where the plaintiff
125
Of course, not every
would otherwise have a right to a jury trial).
plaintiff should have the right to a jury trial, for not every case is meritorious. The purpose of summary judgment is to separate out “necessary” trials from “unnecessary” trials; the issue in any case in which a
motion for summary judgment is made is whether trial is “necessary.”
In civil rights or employment discrimination cases, however, where
subtle issues of credibility, inferences, and close legal questions may
be involved, where issues concerning the “genuineness” or “materiality” of facts are frequently intertwined with law, a single district judge
124

See infra Part II (discussing the amended Rule 56).
Is there a difference between summary judgment and bench trial? The factfinder is the same, but the nature of the proof, the evidence, and the procedural posture are different. See Guggenheim, supra note 110, at 320-24 (deducing that, since limitations on summary judgment exist to protect a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial, those
limitations do not apply to bench trials).
125
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may be a less preferable decisionmaker than a jury. Juries are likely to
be far more diverse and to bring a broader range of perspectives to
126
bear on the problem.
Even if we do not assume that a jury would reach a different conclusion than a judge on the facts of a particular case, the presentation
of live evidence before a jury and the telling of the full story in a public setting can make an important difference to a civil rights or employment discrimination plaintiff. The plaintiff will have a “day in
court,” and the facts of the case will be heard and arguably even authenticated. These issues of “process” can matter a great deal to
127
plaintiffs. Public disclosure of legal issues also matters in important
ways to the evolution of the law. If plaintiffs’ experiences of harm—
which would otherwise be “invisible”—are heard more frequently in
courts and public settings, judges may ultimately view them as constituting a legal claim. Thus, disclosure can help plaintiffs’ claims take
on legal “visibility.” Even more importantly, federal jurisprudence
126

In Gallagher v. Delaney, Judge Jack Weinstein observed that “[a] federal judge is
not in the best position to define the current sexual tenor of American cultures in
their many manifestations” and that “a jury made up of a cross-section of our heterogeneous communities” is the best arbiter of such issues. 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir.
1998). Judge Weinstein further observed that “[w]hatever the early life of a federal
judge, she or he usually lives in a narrow segment of the enormously broad American
socio-economic spectrum, generally lacking the current real-life experience required
in interpreting subtle sexual dynamics of the workplace based on nuances, subtle perceptions, and implicit communications.” Id.
Current statistics on the diversity of the federal judiciary support this view. Across
all federal courts, there are 1285 sitting judges. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Judges of the United
States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/judges_frm (follow “The Federal
Judges Biographical Database” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). Of these judges,
only 18% are female. Id. Looking at both male and female judges, 9% are African
American, 5% are Hispanic, and less than 1% are either Asian American or Native
American. Id. Of female judges, 12% are African American, 7% are Hispanic, and only one, accounting for less than 1% of female judges, is Asian American. Id. There are
no Native American female judges. Id.
Data seem to support the proposition that juries are more diverse and bring
broader perspectives to bear. In one study of several major cities, women comprised
52.9% of federal court juries. See Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 325 n.3 (1995); see
also JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiii-xv (2004) (arguing that groups
of people are “remarkably intelligent” and that “[e]ven if most of the people within a
group are not especially well-informed or rational, [the group] can still reach a collectively wise decision . . . when [its members’] imperfect judgments are aggregated in the
right way”).
127
See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 355, 358-69 (2003) (arguing that the Victim Compensation Fund failed to address
expectations of justice and moral accountability for harm).
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should be developed on a live record, with law shaped by facts, not on
128
pleadings or on summary judgment.
In a ruling on summary judgment, the judge writes a decision in
which, if there are material facts in dispute, she often acts as factfinder, determining whether there is enough evidence to reach a jury.
Judicial opinions on summary judgment are often so mechanistic that
they become “sliced and diced,” a process that, as Stephen Burbank
puts it, “sees less in the parts by subjecting the nonmovant’s ‘evidence’
129
The
to piece-by-piece analysis” instead of analyzing it contextually.
judge makes her own inferences from the record and then grants
summary judgment if she concludes that no “rational trier of fact”
could find for the nonmoving party based on the showing made in the
130
motion and response or, to put it more directly, that no reasonable
juror could find for the nonmovant or disagree with the judge. The
determination of whether a “reasonable juror” could find for the
plaintiff is key. On summary judgment, the judge is effectively sitting
as a juror and deciding whether she could find for the plaintiff.
What is now shocking is the degree to which the Supreme Court’s
decision in Iqbal has made the analytic problems that have been so
deeply troubling in summary judgment jurisprudence explicit at the
pleading stage. Many cases that have already been decided on the
pleadings under Twombly and Iqbal replicate the very problems that
scholars have identified concerning summary judgment. On a plaintiff’s complaint and a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion (or answer),
the court is deciding whether there is “enough” to go forward with the
case—i.e., whether the plaintiff’s complaint and allegations are “plausible.” However, in contrast with the analysis on summary judgment,

128

See Wald, supra note 102, at 1942-43 (questioning whether a jurisprudence
based largely on summary judgment motions can effectively account for the “multivalenced and perspectival qualities of human events”).
129
See Burbank, supra note 107, at 624-25 (calling this process factual and legal
“carving”). Michael Zimmer has also used the phrase “slicing and dicing”: he describes “the common practice of courts in slicing and dicing the evidence supporting
plaintiff’s case in order to grant motions for summary judgment and judgment as a
matter of law.” Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment
Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577, 577 (2001). In this Article, I use the phrase “slice and dice” to
include both factual and legal carving. Some have suggested that this occurs because
law clerks are writing the opinions instead of judges. Penelope Pether suggests that
the de facto delegation of the vast majority of Article III judicial power to judicial
clerks and staff attorneys has resulted in a disproportionate number of decisions
against “have-nots.” Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and
Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10 (2007).
130
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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the complaint, Rule 12 motion, and answer provide an extremely
sparse record on which the district court must make a decision. At
pleading, there has been no opportunity for discovery or for the fuller
elaboration and argumentation that is presented in summary judgment. We are now seeing 12(b)(6) decisions in which the district
court is simply “slicing and dicing” the factual and legal claims presented in the plaintiff’s complaint and making threshold and critical
conclusions, which necessarily involve credibility determinations as to
whether the plaintiff’s claims are “plausible” and whether the plaintiff’s case should go forward. In a sense, it is almost as if all the problems that have previously been identified with summary judgment
have been accelerated to the pleading stage. With Iqbal, a summary
judgment decision is effectively disguised as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
before any discovery occurs.
Summary judgment has also been understood in the context of a
131
Among the most important con“settlement,” not “trial,” culture.
cerns of courts are docket pressures, and these same docket pressures
may affect Iqbal decisionmaking. Some district and circuit judges,
such as Judge Posner, have expressed their concern regarding the use
of summary judgment to alleviate “caseload pressures” and simply
132
clear their civil calendar. Iqbal’s message to district judges is to use
Rule 12(b)(6) instead to clear the civil calendar. For many judges
these pressures are undoubtedly contributing to 12(b)(6) grants on
pleading, as well as to grants of summary judgment.
131

See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 110, at 117 (noting that judicial participation in settlement conferences enhances judges’ ability to clear their dockets); see
also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 50-51 (1996) (observing that most litigants cannot afford
to go to trial without a contingent-fee attorney or liability insurance). There are also
serious questions concerning the expense and cost-benefit ratio of making summary
judgment motions. See Nielsen, Nelson & Lancaster, supra note 29, at 17-20 (detailing
the cost impact of summary judgment motions on settlement negotiations).
132
Judge Posner’s opinion in Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394 (7th
Cir. 1997), says this clearly:
The expanding federal caseload has contributed to a drift in many areas of
federal litigation toward substituting summary judgment for trial. The drift is
understandable, given caseload pressures that in combination with the Speedy
Trial Act sometimes make it difficult to find time for civil trials in the busier federal districts. But it must be resisted unless and until Rule 56 is modified . . . .
Id. at 1397 (citations omitted); see also Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83
F.3d 169, 172 (7th Cir. 1996) (warning judges against using summary judgment to alleviate heavy caseloads). But cf. Anthony v. BTR Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506,
517 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The timing of trials and docket control are matters best left to
the discretion of the trial court.”).
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How much proof is enough to deny summary judgment? Most
lawyers believe that the plaintiff has to convince the judge of the merits of the case—perhaps even that the plaintiff would win the case—
to survive summary judgment and that the primary impact of the trilogy is that it focuses judges entirely on the sufficiency and weight of
133
But on summary
the plaintiff’s proof as developed in discovery.
judgment, this proof is in the form of affidavits and depositions.
While depositions are subject to cross-examination, affidavits are problematic because they are not. This should mean that affidavits are not
134
very useful or persuasive. “Snippets” of testimony from either party
135
can be problematic because they are likely to be misleading. Questions of proof may inevitably involve issues of admissibility and judicial
136
determination of the weight of the evidence. Of course, it depends
on the discovery that was completed and the substantive-law requirements of the claims made. This presents a fundamental conundrum
of summary judgment: issues of credibility are supposed to be decided by the jury, but in order to decide if the proof is enough for a
“reasonable juror,” the judge must implicitly decide issues of credibili-

133

But for a different view, see the comments of District Judge Laura Taylor Swain
of the Southern District of New York, who suggests that in employment cases, plaintiffs
“do not need to convince the court of the merits of the case, just that fact issues have
been raised.” Patrick F. Dorrian, Federal Judges Provide Insights on Summary Judgment Motions, 23 EMP. DISCRIMINATION REP. 516, 516 (2004) (paraphrasing Judge Laura Taylor
Swain’s comments on pleading standards in employment disputes). That may have
been true in the “old” summary judgment framework but, in the “new” framework,
judges may grant summary judgment unless they think that the plaintiff can win at trial.
134
See id. at 516 (paraphrasing the comments of Judge John F. Keenan, who believes that affidavits are generally “not as likely to be [as] persuasive as a witness’s deposition” because they are not subject to cross examination (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
135
Id. If summary judgment requires such extensive discovery and is so fact intensive, there is a serious question whether it is worthwhile for a judge to do this much on
paper rather than to allow the case go forward to trial. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981, 2000 (2004) (observing how summary judgment motions typically focus on only a few issues, thus failing to create an integrated narrative
of law and fact). This implicates old procedural disputes concerning the dichotomy
between law and equity: in law, there is a presumption in favor of oral testimony, while
equity favors paper trials. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 9921000 (1987) (surveying the procedural differences between equity and common law).
136
See, e.g., Rubens v. Mason, 387 F.3d 183, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2004) (reversing the
lower court’s grant of summary judgment because the affidavit that was the basis for
the district judge’s decision was inadmissible).
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137

ty.
With Iqbal, allegations in complaints are now effectively treated
as proof.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Scott v. Harris provides a
138
dramatic example of the summary judgment problem.
Scott involved a § 1983 action brought by a motorist against the police and
other officials claiming use of excessive force during a high-speed
139
The district
chase, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
court denied a summary judgment motion by the defendant, and the
140
Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In the Supreme Court, eight Justices reversed the denial of summary judgment and entered judgment for the
141
defendant. The Justices watched a videotape of the chase and con142
cluded that “no reasonable jury” could find for the plaintiff.
Only
Justice Stevens, in a vigorous dissent, challenged this view. He criticized his colleagues for sitting as “jurors” rather than a reviewing court:
Relying on a de novo review of a videotape of a portion of a nighttime
chase on a lightly traveled road in Georgia where no pedestrians or other “bystanders” were present, buttressed by uninformed speculation
about the possible consequences of discontinuing the chase, eight of the
jurors on this Court reach a verdict that differs from the views of the
judges on both the District Court and the Court of Appeals who are surely more familiar with the hazards of driving on Georgia roads than we
are. The Court’s justification for this unprecedented departure from
our well-settled standard of review of factual determinations made by a
district court and affirmed by a court of appeals is based on its mistaken
view that the Court of Appeals’ description of the facts was “blatantly
contradicted by the record” and that respondent’s version of the events

137

Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .”). In addition, in Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000), the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of jury determinations of credibility. On the one hand, Reeves
suggests that resolving credibility issues and drawing inferences from the evidence “is
the job of the jury” and that courts must disregard such issues at summary judgment.
See Dorrian, supra note 133, at 517 (reporting on the comments of attorney Patricia
Breuninger). On the other, Reeves “eliminated the assumption held by many that employment cases are uniquely appropriate for trial.” Id. (quoting Gary D. Friedman). In
theory, the judge should not weigh credibility, must draw all reasonable inferences
against the moving party, and should deny the motion if there is a genuine issue of material fact. But is this really possible when the judge has to weigh the evidence in order
to decide whether the plaintiff has a chance of winning at trial?
138
550 U.S. 372 (2007).
139
Id. at 375-76.
140
Id. at 376.
141
Id. at 386.
142
Id. at 379-80.
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was “so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could
143
have believed him.”

Justice Stevens refers to the Justices in the majority as “[m]y col144
leagues on the jury,” criticizing the Court for having “usurped the
jury’s factfinding function and, in doing so, implicitly label[ing] the
145
four other judges to review the case unreasonable.” Significantly, he
notes that “[i]f two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently about
the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree
146
with this Court’s characterization of events.”
The impact of Scott v. Harris becomes even more important now in
the context of Iqbal because of the limited record on which a judge
decides whether to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Now, judges must
apply the “no reasonable jury” standard at pleading. Much of the
scholarly discussion concerning Scott has focused on the problem of
“cultural cognition” and the degree to which the Supreme Court Justic147
es’ own normative values shaped the decision.
In Iqbal, however,
these cognitive factors are spelled out with greater specificity. Judges
are ordered to use their “judicial experience and common sense” to determine if the plaintiff’s claims are plausible and the case should proceed.
From empirical work on summary judgment and the “vanishing
trial,” we have information on the actual practice of summary judgment in federal district courts. Longitudinal studies conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center on summary judgment show a particularly
high rate of termination by summary judgment in civil rights and em148
The most recent Federal Judicial
ployment discrimination cases.
143

Id. at 389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 392.
145
Id. at 395.
146
Id. at 396; see also Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose
Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122
HARV. L. REV. 837, 894-902 (2009) (discussing the importance of “judicial humility”).
147
See Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What Difference
Does It Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 421 (2009) (investigating the influence of cultural
values on judicial decisionmaking and distinguishing between conscious bias—
“ideology”—and unconscious bias—“cultural cognition”). But see Harry T. Edwards &
Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors
Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1959-63 (2009) (questioning Kahan’s distinction between ideology and cultural cognition).
148
See Cecil & Cort Memorandum, supra note 19, at 17 tbl.12 (presenting summary
judgment statistics disaggregated into various categories of actions: contracts, torts,
employment discrimination, other civil rights, and other).
144
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Center Report prepared for the Advisory Committee concluded that
“the prominent role of summary judgment in such cases is striking.
Summary judgment motions by defendants are more common in such
cases, are more likely to be granted, and more likely to terminate the
149
Recent data suggests that 70% of summary judgment
litigation.”
motions in civil rights cases and 73% of summary judgment motions
in employment discrimination cases are granted—the highest of any
150
type of federal civil case.
Federal Judicial Center studies of summary judgment practice
have determined that summary judgment is granted disproportionate151
ly to dismiss civil rights and employment cases.
In the most recent
study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, 77% of summary
judgment motions in employment discrimination cases and 70% of
summary judgment motions in other civil rights cases were granted, in
whole or in part, as compared with 61% of summary judgment motions in torts cases, and 59% of summary judgment motions in con152
tracts cases. Further, 20% of employment discrimination cases and
10% of other civil rights cases had at least one summary judgment motion granted, in whole or in part, as compared with 5% of tort and 6%
153
of contracts cases. Additionally, 15% of employment discrimination
cases and 6% of other civil rights cases were terminated by summary
154
judgment, as compared with 3% of torts and 4% of contracts cases.
Another recent study of Federal Judicial Center database cases for fiscal year 2006 showed that an employment discrimination plaintiff
faced an over 80% likelihood that a summary judgment motion would
155
be granted in whole or in part.

149

Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Hon. Michael Baylson 6 tbl.3, 9 tbl.4 (Apr. 12, 2007, revised June 15, 2007) [hereinafter Cecil &
Cort Memorandum], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy
06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf. In some judicial districts, grants of summary judgment in
employment discrimination cases were as high as 93%. Id. at 9 tbl.4. This confirms the
anecdotal reports from federal race- and gender-bias task force reports that have suggested that the application of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases
is problematic. See Wald, supra note 102, at 1938-39 (discussing several reports that
suggest a judicial bias against employment discrimination cases).
151
See Cecil & Cort Memorandum, supra note 19, at 3 (noting the “prominent
role” of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases).
152
Id. at 9 tbl.4.
153
Id. at 16 tbl.11.
154
Id. at 17 tbl.12.
155
Seiner, supra note 17, at 1033 tbl.C.
150
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It appears that there is wide variation in practice between differ156
ent district courts. Although summary judgment is transsubstantive
like all federal procedural rules, scholars have reported the special use
of summary judgment to dismiss sexual harassment and hostile work
157
158
environment cases, race and national origin discrimination cases,
159
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cases, age-discrimination cas160
161
es, and prison-inmate cases.
In sum, summary judgment has historically been viewed as the major procedural hurdle in federal civil litigation, but Iqbal has now
changed the game and pleading has become more crucial. The
“double-whammy” of high pleading standards and defendant friendly
summary judgment practices is a reason for plaintiffs to prefer state
162
court to federal court. Thus, although the information available on
156

See Burbank, supra note 107, at 591 (finding “evidence that the [summary
judgment] termination and other activity rates vary, sometimes dramatically, among
courts and case types”); see also Dorrian, supra note 133, at 516 (quoting Judge John F.
Keenan of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, who
cautions, “You have to be aware of your circuit and its local rules,” and contrasting
Judge Keenan’s practice of holding pre-motion conferences in employment discrimination cases with that of Judge William J. Martini of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, who does not hold pre-motion conferences and was “not
aware of the practice in the District of New Jersey”).
157
See Schneider, supra note 20, at 709-11 (citing evidence that summary judgment
is granted more frequently in employment discrimination cases with female plaintiffs).
158
See Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 895 (2006) (arguing that, based on an empirical study of race,
age, and gender cases, race-based employment cases are more likely to be dismissed at
the summary judgment phase). Parker’s study found that plaintiffs won summary
judgment motions in race discrimination cases only 25% of the time. Id. at 910 n.98.
159
See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101 (1999) (arguing that courts may be abusing summary
judgment in ADA cases); see also Louis S. Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation Under the ADA from the Perspective of the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled for LowIncome Workers in the Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 345, 363 (2000)
(noting that “employees face a Catch-22 situation” when they are forced to demonstrate severe disabilities that do not simultaneously prevent them from doing their
jobs, a situation which often leads to a grant of summary judgment for the defendant).
160
See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use
of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 232-33 (1993) (arguing that courts’ refusal to evaluate the adequacy of employers’ alleged reasons for
discharge “prejudices plaintiffs opposing summary judgment motions”).
161
See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1594-95 (2003)
(reporting that a great majority of inmate civil rights cases are resolved in favor of defendants at the pretrial stage).
162
See Gallagher, supra note 15 (attributing the decline in federal employment
cases at least in part to plaintiffs’ preference for state courts); see also Mauro, supra note
65 (discussing the possible causes for this exodus from federal court, including judicial
bias and ADR).
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plaintiff’s choice of forum and preference for state courts was gathered before Iqbal was decided, summary judgment now plays a role
in choice of forum in cases that could be filed in either state or feder163
al court. With the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, more tort cases
that would otherwise be heard in state court will now be heard in fed164
Furthermore, new pleading rules and summary judgeral court.
ment decisionmaking have made it far more difficult for civil rights
and employment discrimination plaintiffs to get relief in federal court.
C. Daubert
Although Daubert motions regarding expert testimony most often
precede motions for summary judgment, I briefly discuss the former
here in conjunction with summary judgment. Daubert motions, typically presented in motions in limine, are usually initiated by defendants to exclude expert testimony that would be proffered at trial by
165
plaintiffs. They are another significant form of judicial gatekeeping
that has developed over the last thirty years.
There is significant interplay between summary judgment and
Daubert determinations of expert evidence. Daubert plays a critical role
in summary judgment cases because if the judge determines that the
plaintiff’s expert evidence is inadmissible, granting summary judgment becomes significantly easier. Daubert is now viewed as a “sum166
mary judgment substitute.”
The “abuse of discretion” standard of
review used in Daubert judgments is more limited than the more general “de novo” standard used in summary judgment. Thus, Daubert
rulings may be the preferred method of district court resolution be-

163

See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16 (presenting data
gathered between 1970 and 2007).
164
See JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and
Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 745-50 (2004) (describing how CAFA has expanded federal court jurisdiction over tort claims arising under state law).
165
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme
Court directed federal judges to act as “gatekeepers” in examining the method or reasoning underlying proposed expert evidence and to admit only evidence that is reliable and relevant. In this Article, I use “Daubert ” as shorthand for the trilogy of cases
that developed the procedural rules for admissibility of expert testimony, the other
cases forming the trilogy are Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
166
See Lind, supra note 164, at 771 (asserting that the Daubert hearing is the best
example of “summary judgment substitutes” by which “a litigant’s potential to rely on
expert testimony to stave off summary judgment can be foreclosed in advance”).
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cause they provide greater discretion for district court judges and less
167
chance of reversal on appeal.
There is no question that Daubert has both changed the way that
federal district judges assess expert evidence in civil cases and increased summary judgment. A 2001 empirical study prepared for the
RAND Corporation found that “[t]he rise that took place in both the
proportion of evidence found unreliable and the proportion of challenged evidence excluded suggests that the standards for admitting
168
evidence have tightened.” The authors of the RAND study, in a section on the interplay between Daubert and summary judgment, concluded that challenges to expert evidence increased summary judg169
They noted that the frequency with
ments and case dismissals.
which summary judgment was requested
may be due partly to Daubert, but it may be driven by broader trends in
litigation practices that have nothing to do with Daubert. For example,

167

See Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact
of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 289, 324 (noting the more lenient standard of review
that judges enjoy when granting Daubert motions). The procedural interconnections
and overlap between Daubert and summary judgment are troubling. A 2006 petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court in an antitrust case presented the following questions: first, “[w]hether lower courts err when they meld the standards for summary
judgment under [FED. R. CIV. P.] 56 and the relevance and reliability requirements for
admissibility under [FED. R. EVID.] 702”; and second, “[w]hether, in order to clarify the
distinction between admissibility decisions and evidence sufficient to grant summary
judgment, courts have an obligation to give reasons—which cannot include weighing
testimony—why admissible expert evidence that reaches all material facts necessary to
establish a claim for relief under applicable law is not sufficient to avoid summary
judgment.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health
Servs., 549 U.S. 1209 (2007) (No. 06-822). For a discussion of the confusion between
admissibility standards relevant to Daubert determinations and sufficiency standards
involved in summary judgment that arise in Daubert/summary judgment decisionmaking, see Bobak Razavi, Admissible Expert Testimony and Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex and Daubert After Kochert, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 307, 309-11 (2008), which discusses
the “monumental problem” created when summary judgment determinations are
made in the guise of admissibility decisions.
168
LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION, at xiii (2001); see also id. at xv (“Our analysis of district court opinions
suggests that after Daubert, [federal] judges scrutinized reliability more carefully and
applied stricter standards in deciding whether to admit expert evidence.”); Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony
in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 328-31 (2002) (reporting results
from surveys of judges and attorneys that suggest greater scrutiny of scientific evidence
in the wake of Daubert).
169
See DIXON & GILL, supra note 168, at 56 (positing that “challenges to plaintiffs’
evidence have increasingly resulted in case dismissals”).
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judges may have become more receptive to summary judgment requests
in an attempt to resolve cases more quickly and at lower cost. But Daubert may have led challengers to expand the scope of their challenges to
the point where they increasingly challenged the entire basis of the case
170
and thus more frequently requested summary judgment.
171

Although Daubert was thought to primarily affect toxic tort cases,
it now impacts a wide range of cases. Daubert has been applied to anti172
trust cases involving economic experts as well as to cases involving
social science experts, including gender discrimination and gender
173
stereotyping cases. In the tort context, however, “[t]he resulting ef174
fects of Daubert have been decidedly pro-defendant.” Indeed, “[i]n
the civil context, Daubert has empowered defendants to exclude certain types of scientific evidence, substantially improving their chances
of obtaining summary judgment and thereby avoiding what are per175
ceived to be unpredictable and often plaintiff-friendly juries.”
Some scholars have argued that Daubert has effectively changed
176
the substantive law of torts. Others assert that Daubert’s elimination
of jury deliberation for certain litigants has serious race and class conse177
The interrelationship between Daubert and summary judgquences.
178
ment is a crucial dimension of current summary judgment practice.

170

Id. at 56-57.
See Berger, supra note 167, at 290 (noting that Daubert’s effect on plaintiffs’ ability to prove causation drove some to assert that “toxic tort law is being reformulated in
federal court to the advantage of defendants”).
172
See Robert G. Badal & Edward J. Slizewski, Economic Testimony Under Fire, 56
A.B.A. J. 56, 56 (noting that courts are excluding expert economic testimony as unreliable with “increasing frequency” in the wake of Daubert and Kumho).
173
See Peter Nordberg, Daubert Decisions by Field of Expertise, http://daubert
ontheweb.com/fields.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (listing pertinent federal cases organized by type of expert witness involved, including cases involving gender discrimination).
174
See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 473 (2005).
175
Id.
176
See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges
Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 335, 335 (1999) (arguing that federal trial judges have used Daubert to make
“substantive legal rules on causation” in product-liability cases by raising the threshold
of admissibility for scientific evidence, effectively requiring plaintiffs to meet a higher
evidentiary standard to survive summary judgment).
177
See Frank M. McClellan, Bendectin Revisited: Is There a Right to a Jury Trial in an
Age of Judicial Gatekeeping?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 261, 264, 279-80 (1998) (asserting that
Daubert has made it “substantially more difficult for plaintiffs to win product liability
cases” and that it has race and class implications).
178
Although I briefly discuss Daubert issues here, a close study of Daubert in civil
rights and employment discrimination cases is beyond the scope of this Article.
171
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Experts are now widely used in civil rights and employment cases. An article written soon after Daubert was decided reported that,
based on a Westlaw search, one in every eight federal cases citing to
180
Daubert was a civil rights action. The author predicted that, because
of the development of such new claims as disability discrimination and
181
the need for economic proof, Daubert cases would be widespread.
Gender and race stereotyping is an issue at the heart of many cases,
whether involving “maternal wall” or sexual harassment or race discrimination, and there has been considerable scholarship and expert
testimony on cognitive bias in many race and gender discrimination
contexts. Cognitive bias research examines the subtle, often uncons182
Expert testicious biases that affect behavior and decisionmaking.
mony on cognitive bias can address problems of race, sex, or age dis183
For example, Joan Williams and
crimination in the workplace.
Nancy Segal discuss the potential use of expert testimony on cognitive
bias to defeat motions for summary judgment by shifting judicial infe184
Theresa Beiner has proposed the
rences in “maternal wall” cases.
179

179

For example, the use of expert testimony in women’s rights cases is not new.
An early women’s rights case involving expert testimony was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
in which social psychologist Susan Fiske testified that sex stereotyping likely affects
employment decisions such as partnership selection. 490 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1989); see
also Harriet Antczak, Assisting the Trier of Fact: The Relevance of Daubert to Gendered
Expert Testimony in Civil Litigation (Feb. 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that expert testimony in gender cases is often denied on relevance grounds).
180
Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 45 AM. U.
L. REV. 1, 6 n.34 (1995).
181
See id. at 6-7 (listing three possible causes for an increase in the number of
plaintiffs who employ expert testimony: the increasingly “technocratic” nature of our
society, new claims recognized by case law and statute, and the increased value of employment discrimination cases).
182
See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188
(1995) (“[C]ognitive bias may well be both unintentional and unconscious . . . [and
biases] operate beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-awareness.”).
183
This area of research has expanded to include “implicit bias” and its effects on
discrimination. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006) (introducing “implicit bias”
and using analytical methods to prove its existence); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan
T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate
Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1024 (2006) (describing and examining legal actors’
behavioral tendencies).
184
See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 132 (2003)
(“Evidence from empirical social psychology . . . can show that bias against mothers
may not fit the model of a generalized dislike of women; instead, bias may reflect a
more subtle set of stereotypical assumptions about who is competent and who is not.”).
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admission of social science evidence in sexual harassment cases to
185
deal with the gap between the judge and the jury. But, with Daubert,
186
would this testimony even be admitted?
We know that Daubert decisions are a cause of the disappearance
187
of jury trials and public adjudication in federal civil trials.
We also
188
suspect that Daubert has had a chilling effect on plaintiffs. But there
have been no recent empirical studies on the impact of Daubert generally or on civil rights or employment discrimination cases specifically.
There is less information on what is actually happening with Daubert in
189
the pretrial context than on other aspects of pretrial procedure.
Since expert testimony is now widely used in civil rights and employment discrimination cases, there is good reason to believe that the lethal combination of Daubert and summary judgment has affected these
cases as well.

185

THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL
SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 12-14 (2005).
186
See Minna Kotkin, Book Review, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 613, 617 (2005) (reviewing
BEINER, supra note 185) (questioning whether expert testimony in sexual harassment
cases would be effective because it would “undoubtedly provoke a Daubert attack”).
187
See Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U.
PITT. L. REV. 281, 298 (2007) (“Daubert certainly can be abused. The opportunity to
dismiss a case which should be heard by a jury is within every judge’s grasp.”).
188
See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16, at 121 (“Discouragement . . . could explain the recent downturn in the number of [employment discrimination] cases.”). The impact of Daubert on forum shopping is elusive because some
states have accepted Daubert. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 174.
189
Both Margaret Berger, Professor at Brooklyn Law School, and Joe Cecil, Senior
Research Associate at the Federal Judicial Center, have studied the impact of Daubert in
a number of different capacities. Both say that conducting a reliable study of Daubert’s
impact on these cases using the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’s data would
be difficult for a variety of reasons. There has been little scholarly discussion of the
impact of Daubert in civil rights or discrimination contexts. See John V. Jansonius &
Andrew M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing Admissibility, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 318 (1998) (discussing Daubert’s impact in
the employment-litigation context); Deborah Dyson, Comment, Expert Testimony and
“Subtle Discrimination” in the Workplace: Do We Now Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way
the Wind Blows?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 37, 72 (2004) (analyzing the effect Daubert
will have on assessing expert testimony in a racial discrimination case). One study of
district judges who have decided Daubert motions suggests that judges appointed by
Democratic presidents are more likely to admit expert testimony than those appointed
by Republican presidents. See Jeremy Buchman, The Effects of Ideology on Federal Trial
Judges’ Decisions to Admit Scientific Expert Testimony, 35 AM. POL. RES. 671, 680-81, 690
n.11 (2007).
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION
Many important implications, although preliminary, can be drawn
from the gathered data. First, both pleading and summary judgment
decisions appear to result in a high dismissal rate for civil rights and
employment cases. Now, with Iqbal, district judges are likely to dispose
of civil rights and employment cases at pleading—the earliest possible
stage. What used to be done at summary judgment can be done at
pleading, much earlier in the litigation process and without the need
for discovery. With summary judgment and Daubert, cases are dismissed as well, but later in the process, and usually after some discovery. These trends raise important questions as to whether meritorious
cases are being dismissed in the federal courts. These cases are certainly being decided on incomplete factual records. There are also
significant policy concerns with the fact that these cases are now effectively being sent to state courts.
Another implication is that the judicial decisionmaking involved
in Rule 12(b)(6), Daubert, and summary judgment motions with respect to civil rights and employment discrimination cases becomes
private, not public, adjudication. Although not all of these cases may
raise important issues of public concern, many of them will raise innovative or novel claims. Yet if these cases are dismissed on pleading,
Daubert, or summary judgment grounds, they are not likely to enter
the public sphere, with the attendant legitimization of claims and public knowledge of new harms, unless they were particularly newsworthy
when filed. And, of course, cases that are dismissed at the pleading
and summary judgment stages are being decided by district judges,
not juries.
Judicial decisionmaking in all these phases is shockingly consistent, regardless of procedural context. Pleading rules, Daubert decisions, and summary judgment rules are all discrete and purportedly
“neutral,” yet it appears that these “neutral” procedures are being interpreted by many courts in the same way. The consistency of judicial
interpretation in these various procedural contexts, at least at pleading and summary judgment, suggests the need for careful analysis of
federal procedural revision. Every new rule, aspect of a rule, or procedural development, always claimed to be “neutral,” can create an
opportunity for judges to dismiss these cases and interpret the rules in
such a way as to have a “disparate impact.” Thus, every new rule—or
procedural dimension of a new rule, like the proposed Rule 56 “pointcounterpoint” amendment—must be carefully scrutinized, even if it
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looks “neutral” on its face, because it provides an additional opportunity for differential treatment.
This is a significant point which goes back to some of the most
important themes in procedure—the fundamental interrelationship
between substance and procedure. We cannot just assume that procedural developments are neutral and ignore the substantive impact,
particularly on a whole body of law. Substantive decisions can be “disguised as process” and process decisions can operate as a proxy for
190
substantive impacts.
An example of the need for close analysis of “neutral” Rules was
the proposed “point-counterpoint” amendment to Rule 56 that had
been enthusiastically advanced by the Civil Rules Committee. As mentioned earlier, revision of summary judgment in general became a major priority for the Advisory Committee over several years. The Civil
Rules Committee had said that the Rule 56 revisions were proposed in
order to change procedural aspects governing submission of a summary judgment motion and not to change the legal standard for sum191
mary judgment.
Although the Advisory Committee ultimately rejected the “point-counterpoint” amendment, a revised Rule 56 was
192
recently enacted.
The most significant revision was the Committee’s proposal of a
“point-counterpoint” procedure for all district courts. In “pointcounterpoint”, the movant submits its summary judgment motion and
identifies those issues of material fact that are not in dispute, the
nonmovant responds in kind, and the process ends with the movant’s
response. Some jurisdictions have, or have had, local rules that required this. The Advisory Committee amendment sought to make
this “point-counterpoint” process a presumptively uniform procedure
for summary judgment motions in most cases.
The Committee’s Request for Comment described the proposed
Rule 56 “point-counterpoint” amendment in the following way:
Rule 56 is revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summary judgment motions and to make the procedures more consistent with those already used in many courts. The changes are proce-

190

See Martinez, supra note 21, at 1017 (describing how ostensibly procedural rulings in the “war on terror” cases have had profound substantive impacts).
191
The movant must show that there is no “genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
192
The Advisory Committee appointed a subcommittee on Rule 56 that held a
meeting with lawyers and a Mini-Conference. The Committee then subjected the proposed Rule to public comment and three public hearings around the country.
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dural only and do not affect the standard for granting summary judgment. The proposed rule requires that unless the court orders a difent procedure in a case, a party moving for summary judgment must
submit a statement of facts that it asserts are not in genuine dispute and
entitle it to summary judgment. The statement must list the asserted
undisputed material facts in separate, numbered paragraphs, with citations to the record. The party opposing the motion must file a response
to the statement that addresses each fact by accepting, disputing, or accepting it in part and disputing it in part, either generally or for purposes of the motion only. The statement and response are separate from
193
the briefs.

During its revisions of Rule 56, the subcommittee in charge of
Rule 56 held two meetings, the second of which was a miniconference
held in November 2007. Several participants—individuals, representatives of organizations, and federal judges—expressed considerable
concern about the way in which this proposed “point-counterpoint”
format could operate, and argued that it would have a serious impact
on civil rights and employment discrimination cases. There was good
reason to be concerned about whether this new “point-counterpoint”
format would simply exacerbate the “slice and dice” tendencies cur194
As discussed
rently present in summary judgment decisionmaking.
above, scholars and judges have highlighted the “slice and dice” tendencies of federal judicial decisionmaking on summary judgment,
particularly with respect to civil rights and employment discrimination
195
claims. In addition, some participants emphasized the risk of added
expense and litigation costs, particularly for plaintiffs and their lawyers. Nonetheless, this provision was kept in the proposed rule when
it was subjected to comment and hearings.
Comments regarding the proposed amendments were submitted
between September 2008 and March 2009 and were posted online.
Three hearings were also held during this time, and the comments

193

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A SUMMARY FOR
BENCH AND BAR (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/Brochure.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS].
194
Cecil & Cort Memorandum, supra note 19 (studying what the proposed
amendment’s effect, if any, would be on summary judgment practice in federal courts).
195
These are cases in which judges often have to consider whether there are genuine issues of material fact in a holistic way and consider disparate aspects of evidence and discovery together in the context of legal claims. Yet, consistently in these
cases judges fail to do this. For a discussion of how summary judgment opinions “slice
and dice” in a way that eliminates contextual analysis, see Burbank, supra note 107, at
624-25, and Schneider, supra note 20, at 721-25.

8 SCHNEIDER FINAL PRINT REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

2/1/2010 6:30 PM

The Impact of Pretrial Practice on Discrimination Cases

559

196

were fascinating.
The Chief Judge of the District of Alaska, John
Sedwick, who had judicial experience both in Arizona (a jurisdiction
with local rules similar to the proposed “point-counterpoint” format
amendments) and Alaska (a jurisdiction without similar rules) wrote
in opposition to the proposed “point-counterpoint” format. He stated
that his experience “indicate[d] that the requirement to submit lengthy enumerated statements of fact supported by citations to the record
wastes the time of counsel and the court without providing any per197
ceptible benefit.” He detailed the enormous amount of time spent
on summary judgment motions in Arizona as opposed to Alaska and
argued that the proposed rule “will likely shift more responsibility for
198
civil litigation from district judges to magistrate judges.” Several of
his colleagues on the bench with similar dual-jurisdiction experience,
along with several other district judges experienced with “pointcounterpoint” local rules, wrote letters to the Committee in concur199
rence.
Many comments were submitted by individual civil rights and employment discrimination lawyers, as well as plaintiffs’ employment law
200
firms and civil rights impact organizations.
One comment from a
partner in a plaintiffs’ employment discrimination firm emphasized
how these proposed rules would deleteriously affect his firm’s practice
and the practices of other small firms that represent employment dis201
crimination plaintiffs. He detailed his experience with local “point-

196

The hearings were held in Washington, D.C., in November 2008; San Antonio,
Texas, in January 2009; and San Francisco, California, in February 2009. SUMMARY OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 193.
197
Letter from Hon. John W. Sedwick, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist.
of Alaska, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/20
08Comments Committee Folders/CV Comments 2008/08-CV-017-Comment-Sedwick.pdf.
198
Id.
199
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2008 Civil Rules Comments Chart,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008_Civil_Rules_Comments_Chart.htm (last visited
Nov. 15, 2009).
200
See, e.g., Letter from Robert J. Wiley, Rob Wiley, P.C., to Peter G. McCabe,
Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts 1
(Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008 Comments Committee Folders/CV Comments 2008/08-CV-179-Comment-Wiley.pdf (highlighting an employment
law specialist’s opposition to the proposed changes because of their ineffectiveness
with indirect evidence).
201
Letter from Joseph D. Garrison, Garrison, Levin-Epstein, Chimes, Richardson
& Fitzgerald, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts 1-2 (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/200
8 Comments Committee Folders/CV Comments 2008/08-CV-016-comment-garrison.pdf.
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counterpoint” rules that were particularly resource intensive, and he
argued that the proposed rule would make the playing field even
more uneven between plaintiffs and defendants in employment cases
202
in federal courts. Other comments emphasized the narrative structure of civil rights and employment cases and argued that “pointcounterpoint” responses would not work well with “the complex narratives typical to [such] cases,” encouraging lawyers to get caught up in
203
minutiae and overwhelming technicalities.
A particularly critical set of comments emerged from federal
judges who had worked with “point-counterpoint” local rules but decided to stop using them because they found them onerous. Judge
Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California wrote an especially influential memorandum on behalf of
all district and magistrate judges in the Northern District agreeing
with many of the concerns that others had expressed and explaining
that judges in her district had found the proposed rules problematic
204
and ultimately decided to do away with them.
As the Advisory Committee was developing its proposals, it asked
the Federal Judicial Center to examine summary judgment practice
across federal district courts as a means of assessing the potential impact of the proposed amendments to Rule 56. The Federal Judicial
Center Report compared summary judgment practice across districts
with three different types of local rules as well as types of cases includ205
ing both employment discrimination and other civil rights cases.
The Report noted that

202

Id. A listing of all comments on the then-proposed changes to Rule 56 is available on the website of the U.S. Courts. See 2008 Civil Rules Comments Chart, supra note
199.
203
Letter from Stefano G. Moscato, Program Dir., Nat’l Employment Lawyers
Ass’n, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts 3 ( Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008
Comments Committee Folders/CV Comments 2008/08-CV-143-Testimony-Moscato.pdf;
see also Letter from John Vail, Constitutional Litig. Ctr., to Hons. Mark R. Kravitz and
Michael Baylson (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008%20Comments
%20Committee%20Folders/CV%20Comments%202008/08-CV-046-TestimonyCenter%20For%20Constitutional%20Litigation%20%28Vail%29.pdf.
204
See Letter from Hon. Claudia Wilken, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., to
Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure &
Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Procedure 1-2 (Dec. 11,
2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/2008 Comments Committee Folders/CV Comments 2008/08-CV-090-Comment-Wilken.pdf (“A complex narrative cannot be effectively
told in a list of undisputed facts.”).
205
Cecil & Cort Memorandum, supra note 19, at 3.
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[w]hile we found few differences across the three [different types of local rules] in employment discrimination cases, the prominent role of
summary judgment in such cases is striking. Summary judgment motions by defendants are more common in such cases, are more likely to
be granted, and more likely to terminate the litigation. This is true with206
out regard to the nature of the local rules regarding summary judgment.

This strong conclusion does not fully capture the tremendous disparities among types of cases that the data on summary judgment showed,
including a 15% termination rate by summary judgment in employ207
ment discrimination cases, as opposed to a 3% rate in tort cases.
The intense comment and hearing period on the Rule 56 revisions focused primarily on the “point-counterpoint” proposal. One
could fairly ask the question, if employment cases are already “hammered” by summary judgment, why would the “point-counterpoint”
208
format make any difference?
My argument, shared by many other
civil rights and employment discrimination lawyers who submitted
comments or presented testimony at the hearings, was based on a
combination of factors, including the disparate impact that the “pointcounterpoint” provision would have on the narrative dimensions of
civil rights and employment discrimination cases, and the likelihood
that it would exacerbate the judicial tendency to “slice and dice” issues
in summary judgment decisionmaking, which is even more problematic in these cases. In addition, the “point-counterpoint” format increases expense and presents a burden for plaintiffs’ lawyers. Finally,
there seemed to be no real reason that judges needed the format to
help them decide summary judgment motions. All of these factors
weighed against the “point-counterpoint” proposal, and the Commit209
tee ultimately rejected it.

206

Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
Id. at 17 tbl.12.
208
This question was presented to me by Joe Cecil. My written submission to the
Committee and my testimony at the Washington, D.C., hearing in November 2008 attempted to answer this question. See Letter from Elizabeth Schneider, supra note 23.
In addition to the “point-counterpoint” provision of the proposed amendments, and in
light of my argument about “neutral” rules, there are other provisions of the amended
Rule 56 not discussed here that I believe require close scrutiny because they could affect civil rights and employment cases.
209
The Committee recognized that this amendment was controversial and had
“provoked a near avalanche of comments.” Kravitz Memorandum, supra note 24, app.
at C-7. It concluded that “the time has not come to mandate it as a presumptively uniform procedure for most cases. The comments and testimony showed the perils of misuse and suggested that there is less desire for national uniformity than might have
been expected.” Id. at 7.
207
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While this was a good result, the summary judgment amendments
emerged from a civil rulemaking process that has been fairly criticized, both for not being sufficiently attentive to issues of access to
court as well as for arising from committees that are not broadly rep210
Relatively few plaintiffs’ lawyers
resentative of the legal profession.
have been members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules compared with the number of defense lawyers. Lawyers who are appointed to the Committee are usually partners in large law firms who
mostly represent defendants, not full-time public service lawyers. Unsurprisingly, in the wake of the Bush administration and the Rehnquist/Roberts Court, Republican-appointed federal judges outnumber
Democrat-appointed judges on the Committee. It is not yet clear
whether the composition of either the Advisory Committee or the
Standing Committee will change significantly during the Obama administration, given that Chief Justice Roberts makes the appoint211
One certainly hopes that it will. In the meantime, these
ments.
amendments will affect employment discrimination, civil rights cases,
and plaintiffs’ lawyers. In light of the picture presented here, this is
troubling.
III. WHY IS THIS HAPPENING?
Many factors may have given rise to these developments in federal
pretrial practice. It is often difficult to understand developments in
federal civil litigation reform, to identify their various influences, and
to evaluate their impact. There are rarely simple cause-and-effect relationships. I have used the phrase “disparate impact” advisedly to describe the effect that these procedural changes appear to have on civil
rights and employment discrimination cases. The phrase is associated
210

See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal
Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 45-49), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266315 (proposing that the rulemaking process be restructured to enhance access by modifying the composition of the Civil Rules Committee); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope,
52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 613-18 (2001) (arguing that rulemaking committees are disproportionately composed of practitioners from large law firms that represent corporate
defendants).
211
For the present composition of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, see U.S. Courts, Current Membership
with Terms, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Committee_Membership_Lists/ST_Roster
_2009.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). The Chief Justice makes the Committee appointments. See U.S. Courts, Committees of the Judicial Conference, http://www.us
courts.gov/judconf_committees.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (“The Chief Justice
has sole authority to make Committee appointments.”).
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with the problem of neutral rules that are applied unequally in
employment discrimination law.
Here, all we know are
the output results, not why they occurred. In this Part, I explore
potential causes.
The first is the change in the composition of the federal judiciary
over time. To the extent that political affiliation of the appointing
212
president is a good proxy for political ideology, data suggest that a
213
majority of sitting federal judges are ideologically conservative.
Both because of political affiliation and age, many current federal
judges do not have a strong sense of the federal courts’ history as protectors of civil rights and civil liberties, nor of the role they played in
the American civil rights movement. Indeed, a recent empirical study
of the relationship between the political party of the president who
appointed a federal district court judge and outcomes in employment
discrimination cases found a statistically significant difference between
a plaintiff’s chance of success on a summary judgment motion before
a judge appointed by President Clinton and a judge appointed by
214
President Obama’s election could,
President George W. Bush.
therefore, have an important effect on federal civil litigation employment discrimination and civil rights cases. One recent commentator
analyzed the impact President Obama’s judicial nominations could

212

See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 314-15 (2004)
(presenting data showing that a judge’s ideological tendency in several areas of law can
be predicted by the party of the appointing president).
213
As of July 16, 2008, 362 of 660 federal district court judges were appointed by
Republican presidents, while 298 judges were appointed by Democratic presidents.
Daniel De Groot, Fourth Circuit Majority Auditions for JP Stevens’ Job, OPEN LEFT, July 16,
2008, http://openleft.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=6966. Republican-appointed judges
made up a majority of district court judges in eight of the twelve circuits (including the
D.C. Circuit). Id. At the circuit court level, ninety-nine judges were Republican appointees, while sixty-seven were Democratic appointees. Id. Ten of the thirteen circuits had mostly Republican-appointed judges, two had a majority of Democratic
judges, and one was split evenly. Id. On the Supreme Court, seven justices were Republican appointees and two were Democratic appointees (although this split has
shifted to six Republican appointees and three Democratic appointees with Justice
Souter’s resignation and Justice Sotomayor’s appointment). Id.
214
See John Friedl & Andre Honoree, Is Justice Blind? Examining the Relationship
Between Presidential Appointments of Judges and Outcomes in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 89, 96-97 (2007) (showing that plaintiffs had a 38.7% chance of
surviving a summary judgment motion before a Clinton appointee, compared to a
27.8% chance before a Bush II appointee). However, this is a controversial issue. See
Edwards & Livermore, supra note 147, at 1905-07 (arguing that empirical studies do
not meaningfully reflect the effect of ideology on appellate decisionmaking).
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have on the composition of the federal judiciary.
The possibilities
216
for change are significant.
The limited view of federal courts’ historical importance in civil
rights matters that many district judges now hold is ironic, given the
crucial federal subject matter jurisdiction case law that emphasizes the
federal judiciary’s unique role, characterizes the federal courts as a
precious resource, and often seeks to restrict diversity jurisdiction because it effectively requires federal judges to act as state judges, rather
than fulfilling their unique federal duties. Although my focus here is
pretrial practice, the recent Clermont and Schwab study shows that
jury trials result in considerably more favorable verdicts for civil rights
217
This seems to suggest that judges are
plaintiffs than bench trials.
getting rid of civil rights cases, whether through their pretrial decisions on the pleadings, summary judgment rulings, or bench trials.
Second, many federal judges appointed over the last few years appear to be deeply skeptical of civil rights and employment cases. They
do not identify with employment discrimination or civil rights plaintiffs—whether because of race, gender, disability, age difference, or a
218
lack of sensitivity to problems in the workplace. Many judges apparently tend to view these cases as petty, involving whining plaintiffs
complaining about legitimate employment or institutional matters, rather than important civil rights issues. Although these views have the
greatest impact on plaintiffs when held by district judges, circuit
219
judges’ anti-plaintiff attitudes also affect the outcome of cases.
I have had numerous conversations with federal judges who have
said that they believe many employment discrimination cases in federal court are weak and that lawyer case “selection bias” is a cause. But
215

Eric R. Haren, Commentary: The Real Battle for the Federal Judiciary, LAW.COM,
July 31, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432541517&thepage=1.
216
Since Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation, a number of new district and circuit
judges have been nominated. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, PACE OF PRESIDENT OBAMA’S
JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS 1-2 (2009), http://www.afj.org/check-the-facts/nominees/
nomspacefactsheet91509.pdf (reporting that, as of September 15, 2009, President Obama had nominated a total of eight circuit judges and nine district judges). The pace
of these judicial nominations has become a subject of concern. Charlie Savage, Obama
Backers Fear Opportunities to Reshape Judiciary Are Slipping Away, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2009, at A20.
217
Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16, at 130-31.
218
See Selmi, supra note 14, at 561-69 (arguing that judges’ personal perspectives
subconsciously affect their decisionmaking).
219
See Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 212, at 318-21 (showing that affirmative action, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and disability claims reveal evidence of ideological voting).
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220

there is no real empirical support for this proposition. In fact, a recent study of settlement rates concludes that employment discrimination cases settle less frequently than other types of cases, suggesting
that “[i]t is unlikely that employment attorneys fail to substantially
221
The study cites a report that
screen their cases on the merits.”
“plaintiffs’ counsel accept only 5 percent of the employment discrimination claims brought to them by prospective clients, a case accep222
tance rate lower than that reported for plaintiffs’ tort attorneys.”
The authors also conclude that “the weight of evidence suggests that
civil rights victims may be less likely to litigate than other victims, leaving little evidence that their claims are on average objectively weaker,
223
and that the cases’ poor quality explains lower settlement rates.”
Perhaps judges simply have a more punitive reaction to cases they
perceive as weaker, or perhaps just to civil rights and employment discrimination cases. A burgeoning literature on cognitive bias helps to
explain how many judges see these cases, focusing on the problems of
gender, race, and class bias, as well as a lack of judicial humility and
224
capacity to see issues outside their own perspective.
Newly appointed Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings highlight
225
And since Iqbal has now made the
the importance of these issues.

220

See Selmi, supra note 14, at 570-71 (noting that most employment discrimination attorneys are motivated by the profit potential of their cases, and so are unlikely to
litigate frivolous claims).
221
Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 42, at 143-44.
222
Id. at 143-44; see also Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 16, at
114 n.34 (“Contingent-fee attorneys, as well as those looking to fee-shifting, are surely
reluctant to bring questionable claims.”).
223
Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 42, at 145.
224
See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 146, at 896-906 (recommending
that judges exercise judicial humility by recognizing that others may view fact patterns
differently). The concept of “judicial humility” is important and requires further discussion. See Kahan, supra note 147, at 417-22 (discussing cultural cognition—the tendency of individuals to evaluate risks and benefits differently depending on their past
experiences); Schneider, supra note 20, at 766-71 (highlighting the problem presented
by narrow judicial perspectives in cases involving gender); Stephen B. Burbank, On the
Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science and Humility 19-20 (Univ. of Pa. Pub.
Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09-11, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393362 (noting that, in some courts and in some
types of cases, judges’ personal characteristics influence their decisionmaking).
225
See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on the Nomination and Confirmation of the First
Latina Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court: The “High-Tech Lynching” of a “Wise Latina?” 2030, 39-43 (UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 188,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460932 (outlining the ways in which a
Latina justice may bring a new perspective to the Supreme Court’s analysis of cases and
criticizing some Senators’ focus on her “wise Latina” comment).
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application of “judicial experience” and “common sense” grounds for
district courts’ evaluation of the “plausibility” of the allegations in
226
plaintiffs’ complaints, the door is even more open to judicial bias.
A third reason for employment discrimination and civil rights
plaintiffs’ lack of success in federal court may be the increasing and
heavy emphasis on efficiency and docket control. District judges often
report that because of the schedule pressures of the criminal docket,
they want to move cases off the civil docket quickly. Twombly and Iqbal
thus provide a way to get rid of civil cases as quickly as possible. Given
the vulnerability of civil rights and employment discrimination cases,
judges are likely to exercise this option more readily than in other
types of cases.
A fourth factor is the growth of antijury attitudes in many types of
civil cases. In many federal civil cases, such as medical-malpractice ac227
tions, there is a move to take cases away from juries. Daubert certain228
ly encourages this result, as does summary judgment. Twombly and
Iqbal emerge from a similar anti-jury impulse. Several years ago, I participated on a panel at the Third Circuit Judicial Conference, entitled
The New Fact-Finder: Jury to Judge, that discussed these developments in
federal pretrial practice. Some of the federal judges on the panel discussed the importance of judicial factfinding and the way in which
Daubert and summary judgment encouraged it. Now that Twombly and
Iqbal encourage dismissal at the pleading stage, these antijury attitudes
are likely to be reflected in judicial decisions with respect to pleading
as well.
Fifth, it is important to acknowledge the deeply contested struggle
between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ lawyers over the nature of American federal civil litigation. Iqbal has raised the stakes in this struggle.
It is significant that the costs of discovery were identified as reasons for
the higher pleading burden in Twombly and Iqbal. A joint project of
the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System recently issued a report that proposes radical revision of the federal civil

226

See Mauro, supra note 65, at 1 (noting that Iqbal invites judges to “us[e] subjective factors” to evaluate the sufficiency of the complaints).
227
See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1454 (2007)
(noting that pending legislation in Congress would transfer medical-malpractice cases
from juries to administrative health courts).
228
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 1121, 1125-26 (2001) (arguing that Daubert stressed the judicial gatekeeping role).
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229

litigation system, including severely limiting discovery, although the
new report on discovery from the Federal Judicial Center suggests that
discovery abuse is not the serious problem that the Court claimed it to
230
The Standing Committee is sponsoring a conference in May
be.
2010 that will consider some of these issues. But the entire system of
federal civil litigation is under attack. Pleading is the first round of
this battle, but, for some participants, the goal is the end of (or at least
severe limitations on) discovery. The war is about the future of federal civil litigation and access to justice in the federal courts.
Sixth, perhaps the picture presented here is incomplete and the
situation is really more complicated—perhaps more cases are going to
arbitration and mediation, as some defense lawyers suggested in re231
sponse to the most recent Clermont and Schwab findings.
Other
“managerial” developments in the federal courts, such as settlement,
summary jury trials, and the use of “neutrals,” may also have a disparate effect on civil rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs. It
is difficult to analyze the impact of all of these issues, and they undoubtedly play out differently in different federal courts. However,
they are vital to understanding the broader picture.
Finally, my discussion raises two important questions: First, why is
it a problem if more civil rights and employment cases are filed in
state court? Assumptions about the primacy and superiority of federal
courts as a forum for these cases might be historically specific and romanticize many federal judges’ role in the civil rights movement. Given ideological changes in the federal judiciary, some have argued that
that is the case. The traditional rationales for federal court disposi229

INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS. & AM. COLL. OF TRIAL
LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 4-24 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/Content/
NavigationMenu/Publications/AllPublications/default.htm (follow “ACTL-IAALS Official Final Report” hyperlink).
230
In a survey of attorneys in recently closed civil cases, which the Federal Judicial
Center conducted in May and June of 2009, more than 60% of respondents (and two
out of three defendant’s attorneys) reported that the disclosure and discovery in the
closed cases generated the “right amount” of information. More than half reported
that the costs of discovery were the “right amount” in proportion to their clients’ stake
in the closed cases. The median estimate of the percentage of litigation costs incurred
in discovery was 20% for plaintiffs and 27% for defendants. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER NATIONAL, CASEBASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf.
231
See Gallagher, supra note 15.
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tion are that life tenure protects judicial independence and that state
court judges are exposed to more political pressure, particularly if
matters in dispute involve state agencies or other branches of state
government. Are these assumptions still true? Are they even more salient today, given the huge amount of campaign money and lobbying
232
involved in state judicial elections? The Supreme Court’s recent de233
cision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., involving a West Virginia
Supreme Court judge who received a massive campaign contribution
relating to a matter pending before him but failed to recuse himself, is
simply one example of corruption in state courts.
The second question goes beyond the federal/state dichotomy
presented here. If more civil rights and employment discrimination
cases end up in state court, will state courts begin to copy the federal
procedural developments that I have described here in order to clear
their dockets of these cases? Will state court judges begin to exhibit
the same bias against employment discrimination and civil rights cases
that we have seen federal judges develop? Many states model their
procedural rules and decisions on the Federal Rules and federal pro234
cedure, so it is certainly possible. The data on state judges’ political
affiliations is more elusive because each state has a different court system with different subject matter jurisdictional requirements. Moreover, as I have already suggested, the risks of political pressure are more
considerable in state court. This suggests that state courts might not
permit civil rights and employment discrimination cases to be determined on the merits any more than federal courts appear to permit.
232

See Editorial, The Best Judges Business Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2007, at A18
(reporting that thirty-nine states elect at least some of their judges and arguing that
“[t]he problem of wealthy interests’ trying to influence court decisions by pouring
money into state judicial elections continues to escalate . . . . So does the threat to the
impartiality, independence and integrity of the nation’s courts.”); see also Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that judges can announce
their political beliefs during judicial election campaigns); Brendan H. Chandonnet,
Note, The Increasing Politicization of the American Judiciary: Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and Its Effects on Future Judicial Selection in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 577, 582-83 (2004) (discussing the financing of state judicial campaigns).
233
129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
234
See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 17 (7th ed. 2008) (“[T]he Rules
have had an influence far beyond the courts for which they were written. Federal
courts hear only 2 percent of civil cases in the United States. But the model
represented by the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]-—merger of law and equity, relaxed pleading, flexible joinder of claims and parties, and broad discovery—have deeply influenced the procedure of state courts. . . . [E]very state now uses a procedural
model that embraces most of these principles. Thirty-five states have gone so far as to
adopt the ‘federal’ Rules as their own procedural code.”).
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IV. CORRECTING THE IMPACT
Understanding the impact of these seemingly interrelated dimensions of the federal litigation process raises doubts about what “neutral” means for rule and procedural change in the federal courts. We
cannot assume that procedural revision will not provide an additional
excuse for dismissal, or application of a higher pleading burden, or
summary judgment. Clearly our aspirations for transsubstantive federal procedure are not being met. Federal courts are getting rid of
civil rights and employment discrimination cases and implicitly sending a message that state courts are where these cases should be heard.
The federal judiciary is transforming a major portion of its civil caseload. Although we can debate the pros and cons of federal and state
courts as the protectors of rights, the shift is undeniably big.
So what would make a difference? First, proceduralists and rulemakers need to pay close attention to the disparate impact of federal
procedure on civil rights and employment cases. Of course, it is hard
to find solutions to these problems for the reasons that I discussed
previously. Second, the appointment of more federal judges whose
life experiences and perspectives make them open to the kinds of circumstances that employment discrimination and civil rights cases
present might also have an effect. We need judges who are willing to
consider and understand experiences outside of their often privileged
circumstances. We need judges who recognize the need for humility
235
We need
and who understand the limits of judicial factfinding.
judges who have a sense of history and of the federal courts’ impor236
These issues, which
tance to “little people,” not just corporations.
emerged in sharp relief during Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s Supreme
Court nomination and confirmation hearings, highlight the need for
237
appointment of federal judges with diverse perspectives. Hopefully,
the new federal judges that President Obama nominates will be confirmed and bring these broader perspectives to their judging.
Federal judges should not be dismissing employment discrimination and civil rights cases so early in the pretrial process. The developments in federal civil pretrial practice that I have described have
235

See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 146, at 896-906 (arguing that judges
should not privilege their own factual perceptions).
236
Thanks to Vicki Jackson for this point.
237
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 225, at 39-43 (criticizing senators who spoke at Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing for focusing on the Justice’s “wise Latina”
statement, because the statement merely suggests that she believes that “diversity of
perspective among judges matters”).
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not only harmed many civil rights and employment discrimination
plaintiffs, but they have skewed the role of the federal courts and the
development of federal jurisprudence. There should be a presumption that judges will allow cases to go forward and become fully developed on the basis of the facts. This will ensure that judges make reasoned decisions about the merits of the cases. We have to recognize
the disparate impact of transsubstantive procedure on civil rights and
discrimination claims. The historic role of federal courts in the protection of civil rights and freedom from discrimination is at stake.

